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INTRODUCTION

A. Summary
Differing interpretations of the relationship between the
landmark cases of Frank v. Magnum' and Moore v. Dempsey2
-in which seemingly identical facts led to diametrically opposed
resultsS-lie at the heart of the current controversy over the
appropriate scope of federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions.4
In both cases, unpopular defendants were tried in mob-dominated Southern courtrooms in the wake of murders that had

1. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
2. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
3. See Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 417, 423-24 (James Acker

et al. eds., 1998) (describing cases); Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 37 HARv. L. REV. 247, 248 (1924) ("[1n two cases,
separated by a period of nine years, presenting at least strikingly similar circumstances, the Supreme Court has reached opposite results.").
4. See, e.g., Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death:
A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part Two), 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 303,
358 (1996) (stating that eight years after his dissent in Frank, "Holmes's view of
habeas corpus became the majority view in Moore v. Dempsey. Rigid procedural-default rules cast aside the justice done in Moore v. Dempsey, and, together with the
other restrictive procedural rulings of the Rehnquist Court, return habeas corpus to
the injustice of Frank v. Magnum.") (footnotes omitted).
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shattered the local community, brought federal habeas corpus
petitions,' and urged the Supreme Court to rule that egregious
due process violations had been responsible for their convictions
and death sentences.' But the outcomes were entirely different.
The Court refused to intervene in Frank (which ultimately resulted in the lynching of an innocent Jew), but granted relief in
Moore (which ultimately resulted in freedom for innocent
blacks)-asserting, all the-while, that there was no inconsistency
between the two decisions.7
In recent times, those who support broad federal habeas
corpus review of the constitutionality of state convictions-those
who may loosely be called "liberals'"-have generally taken the
view that the cases are inconsistent. Frank, they say, unjustifiably narrowed the scope of the federal courts' habeas corpus
investigations by mandating deference to states' procedurally
adequate mechanisms for the correction of error in criminal
trials no matter how wrong the outcome of the procedures; it
was rightly overruled by Moore, which called for a searching
inquiry into the facts underlying petitioners' constitutional

claims.'

5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (authorizing federal courts
to issue writs of habeas corpus ordering the release of a person "in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court . : . on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
6. Both cases display many of the features frequently present where the death
penalty is at issue. See Freedman, supra note 3, at 424-25 (observing that, as numerous studies show, cases of capital defendants "ire more likely than those of defendants not facing execution to have been infected by distortions arising from racism, the incompetence of defense counsel, their own mental limitations, public passion, political pressures, or jury prejudice or confusion," all of which results in "a
dangerous increase in the risk that the system will make a fatal error.").
7. See 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.4d, at 61-62 (3d ed. 1998). See also infra text accompanying notes 258-61 (evaluating Professor Liebman's attempt to reconcile the cases).
8. On the Court, this argument was originally made by Justice Brennan for
the majority in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-23, 434 n.42 (1963).
Although the authority of Fay was seemingly undermined by the long passage
of dicta in Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-51 (1991), repudiating its approach to procedural default, see Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus Cases Rewrote
the Doctrine, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, § 6 n.21 (criticizing this decision), three
Justices made clear the following year that they agreed with Justice Brennan's view
of the relationship between Frank and Moore. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299
(1992) (concurring opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.); see
also Wainwright" v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (describing the cases as "in large
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Those seeking to limit habeas corpus have argued that the
cases are consistent and that the Court should adhere to the
doctrine that they perceive as governing both. For "conservatives," Frank did indeed set forth a rule that federal habeas
courts should give heavy deference to state proceedings. In their
view, the rule was (and is) correct, and Moore applied
it-although, because of the extreme inadequacy of the state's
review process in that particular case, the result was a victory
for the petitioners.9
This debate about the past-which intensified ° in the runup to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 1' limiting the right of state
part inconsistent with one another").
In the law reviews, the principal support for the Brennan thesis came from
Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 579, 646 (1982) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 252-54). See generally
Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1329 n.53 (1961) ("The opinion of the Court in Moore does not
state that Frank v. Magnum was overruled, but the dissent recognizes the realities."); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 105 (1959) ("Frank v. Magnum was substantially discredited eight years
later in Moore v. Dempsey.").
9. This theory, which appears to have the support of three current Justices, see
Wright, 505 U.S. at 285-86 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J. & Scalia, J.), was previously advanced by Justice Harlan in Fay, 372 U.S. at
457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Moore] cannot be taken to have overruled Frank; it
did not purport to do so, and indeed it was joined by two Justices who had joined
in the Frank opinion."); see also infra note 266 (quoting this latter passage more
fully).
Its law review origin is Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 488-89 (1963) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 247-51, 257).
10. See, e.g., Avern Cohn, Active Judiciary Serves Democracy, DET. NEWS, Dec.
29, 1996, at B2; Susan N. Herman, Clinton Takes Liberties with the Constitution,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1996, at A46; Anthony Lewis, Crime Against Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 1991, at A15. All three of these authors (a federal District Judge, a law
professor, and a former Supreme Court reporter for the New York Times) took the
view that the Supreme Court in Moore overruled Frank and expressed concern that
various proposals to limit federal habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions
would return the law to its prior unjust state. For a summary of these proposals
prior to the Republican capture of Congress in the November, 1994 elections, see
Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331 (1993).
11. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244, 2253-55 and adding §§ 2261-66). The background of the statute is canvassed in Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF.
L. REV. 381 (1996), and its practical effects are set forth in Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, The Crisis in Capital Representation, 51 REC. ASSOC. BAR
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prisoners (especially Death Row inmates) to obtain federal habeas corpus review of their convictions-is taking place with a
sharp eye on the present and near future. One key statutory
revision made by AEDPA was to rewrite 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to
require some increased degree of respect by federal habeas corpus courts for prior state proceedings challenging the same conviction. The Courts of Appeals have been hopelessly split over
the precise contours of this requirement, however, 12 and the
matter3 has only been partially clarified by the Supreme

Court.

Meanwhile, in the world of historical (as opposed to legal)
inquiry, Frank and Moore have drawn continuing attention not
only because both were major national events, but because they
encapsulate a swirl of sexual, racial, religious and regional tensions in the context of an urbanizing, industrializing and ethnically diversifying society. 4 But legal scholarship has made little use of the historical work that has been done. 5 Moreover, a

CITY OF N.Y. 169, 192-94 (1996).

12. See Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 885-91 (3d Cir. 1999) (reviewing Circuits).
13. In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Court explicitly rejected
the formulations that had previously been applied by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits,
see Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1521-22 (opinion of O'Connor, J., speaking for the Court
on this point), and inferentially invalidated those of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, see Neeley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d
856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), reversed on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). It also
provided potent ammunition for the argument that the remaining circuits would
need to revisit their positions. This conclusion follows from that fact that although
the Justices split 5-4 when discussing the abstract issue of statutory interpretation,
they ruled 6-3 in petitioner's favor on the merits-meaning that even the more restrictive test enunciated by Justice O'Connor should as a practical matter increase
the availability of federal habeas corpus relief under AEDPA beyond what the lower
courts had thought safe to grant.
Indeed, vindicating the predictions of several commentators, see, e.g., Freedman, supra note 3, at 428-34; Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and.Effective Death Penalty Act and
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1997), Williams appears to
reinforce the message of the developing jurisprudence under the statute: the Court
had shaped habeas corpus law to its liking prior to 1996 and is unwilling to read
AEDPA as imposing any significant additional restrictions. See Williams v. Taylor,
120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
14. See infra notes 22 (describing literature on Frank), 138 (describing literature
on Moore).
15. This is not unusual in legal scholarship, particularly legal scholarship on
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great deal of previously unmined archival material illuminating
the cases exists.1"
This Article seeks to make a contribution to the integration
of historical and legal knowledge.
First, using previously unutilized historical materials, it
provides the first comprehensive account of the procedural steps
in the cases.17 It then draws on this investigation to reach a
novel legal conclusion: The Frank and Moore cases are consistent, and both require in-depth federal habeas corpus review of
state prisoner convictions. The differing outcomes of the cases
reflect no more than differing discretionary determinations in
specific factual settings."
Second, this Article suggests a reconciliation between the
historical and legal modes of explaining legal decisions. 9 From
a realistic or "historical" perspective, outcomes result from the
subjective motivations of individual judges. From a formalistic or
"legal" perspective, the outcome of a later case results from the
application or non-application of the rule laid down by an earlier
case. My claim is that, while the identity and motivation of legal
decisionmakers critically affect the outcome of cases at the time
they are decided, in the long run, the influence of legal opinions
is likely to depend on their intellectual merits. Leo Frank, his
lawyers, and the Justices who decided his case are now dead.
Their personal traits were important in determining why the
Supreme Court ruled as it did during their lifetimes. But

habeas corpus. See Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification
Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 451, 451 (1996); Morton J. Horowitz, "Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?", 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 551, 553-54 (1997).
With respect to the subject immediately at hand, there is a promising exception on
the horizon in Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MicH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000), which discusses both cases in historical
context and takes a viewpoint generally similar to my own.
16. See, e.g., infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (describing draft opinion
of Circuit Justice Lamar in Moore previously unknown to scholars); infra notes 150,
185 (describing previously overlooked court papers in Moore); infra notes 228-30 and
accompanying text (presenting first-hand accounts of Supreme Court oral argument
in Moore).
17. Because, as indicated supra note 16, this detailed litigation history is based
upon a number of previously unpublished sources, it should be valuable to future
scholars regardless of what they may think of my own theses.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
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Frank's enduring importance, to history as well as to law, will
be doctrinal-and specifically, in my view, in its mandate for the
searching federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.
Both aspects of the Article rely heavily on the published and
unpublished writings of Justice Holmes-who wrote the dissent
in Frank and the majority opinion in Moore and would, I think,
support the conclusions reached here.
B. Outline
Part II describes the legal proceedings leading to the Supreme Court decision in Frank, and after Part III sets forth a
transitional chronology, Part IV does the same for Moore.
Part V, after considering and rejecting the legal explanations that have so far been offered for the outcomes, argues that
both decisions relied upon the same quite broad rule. Both cases
recognized that federal courts reviewing state convictions on
habeas corpus had the power to go behind the record of the state
court proceedings and conduct a factual inquiry into the existence of a constitutional violation; they differed only as to
whether that power should have been exercised in the situation
at hand. This consistency has been obscured by the dramatic
facts and manifest injustice of Frank-whose real-world outcome
was that an innocent man was lynched. But it was in Frank,not
Moore, that the Supreme Court first recognized the legal and
practical imperative of a federal habeas corpus review that
"look[s] through the form and into the very heart and substance
of the matter.""
Finally, Part VI, noting the obvious importance of the differing identities of the Justices who decided the two cases, offers
some thoughts on the utility and limits to us, as lawyers who
need to make predictions and as individuals of finite lifespans,
of the legal and historical modes of explaining the outcome of
cases. My somewhat counter-intuitive suggestion is that the

20. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 332 (1915) (discussed infra note 260 and
accompanying text). See also Frank, 237 U.S. at 331 (quoted and discussed infra
note 102 and accompanying text).
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"historical" perspective has more explanatory power as a shortrun matter and the "legal" one more over the longer term.2 '
II. THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN FRANK
At around 3 AM on April 27, 1913, a black night watchman
at the National Pencil Factory in Atlanta found the badly
abused corpse of 13-year-old Mary Phagan, a white employee.'

21. See supra text accompanying note 19.
22. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE 1-2 (Notable Trials Library ed. 1991). This work, published in 1987 by Brown Thrasher and in 1968 by
Columbia University Press, has not undergone any substantive revision since the
research for it was conducted in the mid 1960s, see id. at ix-xi, although the 1987
and 1991 editions annex an undesignated appendix containing some important additional documentation first published by the Nashville Tennessean on March 2, 1982
(hereinafter Tenn. App.) and make the briefest of allusions to the posthumous pardon granted by the Georgia Board of Pardons, see Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years
After Lynching, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, at A16. These developments are integrated into ROBERT SEITZ FREY & NANCY THOMPSON-FREY, THE SILENT AND THE
DAMNED: THE MURDER OF MARY PHAGAN AND THE LYNCHING OF LEO FRANK (1988).
In addition, HARRY GOLDEN, A LITTLE GIRL IS DEAD (1965) is based on a great deal
of primary research.
Nonetheless, Dinnerstein's work remains perhaps the most useful historical account of a case that "led to the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan and the founding of
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith," Florence King, Murky New View of a
Southern Tragedy, NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1988, at B9 (reviewing MARY PHAGAN, THE
MURDER OF LITTLE MARY PHAGAN (1988)). See generally Nancy MacLean, The Leo
Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Making of Reactionary
Populism, 78 J. AM. HIST. 917, 917-18 (1991).
For an overview of publications on the case in various genres, see FREY &
THOMPSON-FREY, supra, at 137-45.
Since the appearance of this last work, the case has been the subject of a
competent sketch, ALBERT S. LINDEMANN, THE JEW ACCUSED 235-72 (1991), a novel,
DAVID MAMET, THE OLD RELIGION (1997), a New York musical, PARADE, see Too
Serious to Sing About?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1998, at B7, and an off-Broadway play,
THE LYNCHING OF LEO FRANK, see D.J.R. Bruckner, A Story Still Painful After Repeated Tellings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at B5. Additionally, Steve Oney, whose
forthcoming book on the case should prove to be of great value, has provided an
accessible summary in Steve Oney, Murder and Bigotry in the South: The Story of a
Lynching in "Parade",N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, Sec. 2, at 7; see also Don Melvin,
Sordid Old Secret Comes to Light, Gives One Pause, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 2, 1997,
at 1G (previewing Oney's findings).
A useful general account of this period from a Supreme Court perspective is
contained in Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51
VAND. L. REV. 881 (1998), which complements many of the themes of this Article.
See also Sandra L. Wood et al., The Supreme Court, 1888-1940: An Empirical Overview, 22 SOC. Sci. HIST. 201 (1998). See generally GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING
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A few days later, the police arrested Leo M. Frank, the plant's
superintendent and part owner,' a rising member of the Jewish community who had been elected president of the local B'nai
B'rith the previous year.'
As the investigation unfolded, it generated new revelations-reliable and unreliable-on a daily basis (including many
centering around Jim Conley, a black employee of the plant, who
was to become Frank's chief accuser but who was almost certainly the actual killer).' Sensational newspaper coverage
roiled public passions. 6 Indeed, "[n]o trial in Georgia's history
rivaled Leo Frank's for public interest.... For more than four
months, the newspapers featured the crime above all other subjects, and outside the state the trial made front page headlines
in the largest cities of the South."27
The prosecution team at trial was led by Solicitor Hugh M.
Dorsey, who would later be one of the State's counsel in the
Supreme Court,' and, on the strength of his success, be twice
elected Governor of Georgia.' The defense was conducted by
prominent local trial lawyers, 0 one of whom was Dorsey's

WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1940 (1998).

23.
24.
25.

See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 2-4; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 23-24.
See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 6.
See FREY & THOMPSON-FREY, supra note 22, at 132; DINNERSTEIN, supra

note 10, at 125, 127-29, 169-71; Tenn. App., supra note 22, at 15-18; GOLDEN, supra
note 22, at 229-31; see infra notes 53, 118 (noting Conley's reported confession to his
own lawyer). Conley was eventually sentenced to a year on a chain gang as an accessory after the fact to the murder, on the theory that he had helped Frank dispose of the body; he had several brushes with the law in subsequent years, and
died in 1962. See DINNERSTEIN, supra, note 22, at 158; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at
199.
26.

See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 11.

27. Id. at 37. Dinnerstein adds that, at this stage, "outside the South few people knew that Leo Frank existed." Id.
28.

See infra text accompanying notes 94-99.

29. See Steven J. Goldfarb, Framed, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1996, at 108, 113; see
also infra note 130. After a review of previously unexamined documents, Goldfarb

concludes that "Dorsey urged witnesses to embellish their testimony, even lie under
oath, to build a case against Frank," thus assuring "that Leo Frank would not receive a fair trial for a crime he almost certainly did not commit." Goldfarb, supra, at

113. See also GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 65 (describing Dorsey's suppression of exculpatory X-rays); see infra note 63 and accompanying text (noting other prosecuto-

rial misconduct).
30. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 37, 57 (suggesting that defense lawyers
"completely misjudged the nature and extent of the public hostility against Frank"
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brother-in-law.3 1 Four weeks of testimony, highlighted by the
accounts of Conley and Frank himself, were followed by several
days of floridly oratorical summations whose progress was monitored by a demonstrative crowd of several thousand gathered
inside and outside the courtroom.32
In this atmosphere, the editors of the three Atlanta papers
wrote to the trial judge urging him to take precautions against
the possibility of mob violence if Frank should be acquitted; the
judge accordingly met with counsel in chambers, and secured an
agreement that only Dorsey-and not Frank or any of his lawyers-would be present when the verdict was returned.33
Within sight of the jury, the judge also discussed security
arrangements with the commanding officer of the National
Guard and the Police Chief. 4
When the jury announced its verdict, an enormous din
erupted from the crowd outside; the windows had to be shut so
that the juror's responses could be heard when they were polled
individually.3"
"The day after Frank had been found guilty, Judge Roan
secretly convened the principals in the case and sentenced
Frank to hang. The proceedings had been arranged quickly and

and that "their trial strategy was not well planned."); GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 99102 (detailing the author's view that lawyers "conduct[ed] as inept a defense of an
innocent man as was ever offered in an American courtroom"); Leonard Dinnerstein,
The Fate of Leo Frank, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1996, at 99, 108 (Defense counsel "failed
to expose the inaccuracies in Conley's testimony, and they blundered by asking him
to discuss occasions when Frank had allegedly entertained young women.. . . The
defense attorneys demonstrated their limitations once more by ignoring relevant
constitutional questions in their original appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court.").
31. See GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 205.
32. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 40-47, 49-51, 52-55; GOLDEN, supra note
22, at 177-94. The legal record on this issue is assembled in Defendant's Motion for
New Trial, which is described infra at text accompanying notes 39-48 and reprinted
in Transcript of Record at 137-43, 181-95, Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)
(No. 775).
33. See GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 194; DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 55.
34.
35.

See GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 194-95; DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 54.
See GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 195; DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 55. For

the description of this episode by Frank's counsel as contained in their motion for a
new trial, see Transcript of Record at 143, Frank (No. 775) (urging that it would be
"inconceivable [for] any juror, even if the verdict was not his own, to announce that
it was not, in the midst of the turmoil and strife without").
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without fanfare because Roan feared the consequences of having
Frank appear in public again.""
Frank's lawyers issued a statement saying that, in light of
"the temper of the public mind," the proceedings had been "a
farce and not in any way a trial" since it "would have required a
jury of Stoics, a jury of Spartans to have withstood this situation."3 7 They announced that they would appeal.'m
The first step was a motion for a new trial. The original
motion, filed on August 26, 1913 (the day after the verdict and
the day of sentencing), contained only a few barebones sentences, but these included assertions that "the verdict is contrary to
the evidence" and "against the weight of the evidence,"3 9 which
were sufficient to trigger the judge's review of those issues. 4' As
eventually amended, the motion included over one hundred
grounds of error.41 Most of these related to evidentiary rulings,4 2 particularly ones admitting testimony that Frank had in
various instances engaged in sexual activity with other women
in the factory;43 some attacked various prosecution arguments

36. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 57.
37. The statement, which was published in the three Atlanta newspapers on August 27, 1913, is reprinted in GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 198-99. Frank, who had reportedly been awaiting the verdict confident of an acquittal, is said to have exclaimed on hearing of it, "My God . . . even the jury was influenced by'that mob."
Id. at 197. See also DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 55-56.
38. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 57.
39. Transcript of Record at 44, Frank (No. 775).
40. See Frank v. State, 80 S.E. 1016, 1034 (Ga. 1914); Transcript of Record,
supra note 32, at 219; infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
41. Compare Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 312 (1915) (noting 103 grounds,
which accurately reflects the number asserted in the copy of the motion included in
the Transcript of Record, Frank (No. 775)) with DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 77
(reporting 115 grounds). The original new trial motion is reproduced in Transcript of
Record at 44, Frank (No. 775), and the amended one in id. at 45-219. The amended
motion argues that the various actions complained of were erroneous and prejudicial
but cites no legal authority, state or federal. However, the grounds based on public
tumult claim that the result was that the defendant did -not have the fair and impartial jury trial guaranteed to him by the state's laws and Constitution, id. at 140,
142, 147. The last of these claims, ground of error number 75, is further described
infra note 48.
42. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 111-12, 117-18, Frank (No. 775) (attacking
admission of testimony that Frank, once in jail, refused to see Conley or detectives
except in presence or with consent of counsel); cf Frank v. State, 80 S.E. 1019,
1027 (Ga. 1914) (responding to this claim).
43. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 48-103, 106-08, 118-19, 120-24, 128-29, 13536, 149-50, Frank (No. 775). See also id. at 113-15 (complaining that the jury was
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as prejudicial;44 a few challenged the refusal of particular jury
instructions;" and two alleged that specific jurors had formed
fixed opinions of Frank's guilt prior to trial.4
As to the issues that eventually were before the Supreme
Court of the United States in its Frank case, the grounds also
included "several raising the contention that defendant did not
have a fair and impartial trial, because of alleged disorder in
and about the court-room including manifestations of public
hostile to the defendant sufficient to influence the
sentiment
47
jury."
The Supreme Court continued, accurately,
In support of one of these, and to show the state of sentiment as
manifested, the motion stated: The defendant was not in the
court room when the verdict was rendered, his presence having
been waived by his counsel. This waiver was accepted and acquiesced in by the court, because of the fear of violence that might be
done the defendant were he in court when the verdict was rendered.' But the absence of the defendant at the reception of the

allowed to hear insinuation that Frank had made homosexual proposition to a 15year-old black employee). See generally DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 51; infra note
59.
44. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 144-45, Frank (No. 775) (objecting to
prosecution's use in argument of defense failure to cross-examine state's witnesses
concerning sexual misconduct); id. at 166-67 (objecting to prosecution argument:
"This man Frank, with Anglo-Saxon blood in his veins, a graduate of Cornell ...
this man of Anglo-Saxon blood and intelligence, refused to meet this ignorant negro
Jim Conley . . . upon the flimsy pretext that his counsel was out of town but when
his counsel returned . . . he dared not let him meet him."). See also id. at 167-73.
45. See id. at 136-37 (challenging failure to give proposed jury instructions concerning circumstantial evidence and one that no inference of wrong-doing should be
inferred from failure to cross-examine government's witnesses to collateral misconduct, cf. Frank, 80 S.E. at 1031 (responding to this claim)); Transcript of Record,
supra note 32, at 143-44 (attacking failure to give instruction, "although no written
request was formally made therefor," that jury should reject unless otherwise corroborated entire testimony of witness who knowingly swears to any falsehood, in
light of the fact that, to the extent he swore to aiding Frank in the disposal of the
body, Conley "admitted upon the stand that he knew he was lying in the affidavits
made by him."). See also id. at 173 (attacking failure to give instruction, apparently
also not requested at trial, that if jury found Conley to be accomplice, his testimony
could not be accepted without corroboration).
The jury charge actually given is reproduced in id. at 220-24.
46. See Transcript of Record at 146-47, 173-207, Frank (No. 775).
47. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 312 (1915). See Transcript of Record at
109-10, 117, 137-43, 147-48, 181-95, Frank (No. 775).
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verdict, although thus mentioned, was not specified or relied upon
as a ground for a new trial..
The government responded to the new trial motion with
affidavits from eleven of the twelve jurors (the twelfth being out
of town on business) attesting to their impartiality, asserting
that they had made up their minds strictly on the evidence *presented, and affirming their continued agreement with the verdict they had reached.49

48. Frank, 237 U.S. at 312. The passage of the amended new trial motion quoted by the Court is to be found at Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 148
(ground of error number 75). The ground of error, stated in twelve paragraphs, alleges that the .defendant "did not have a fair and impartial jury trial, guaranteed to
him under the laws of this State, for the following reasons," id. at 147.
The listed reasons include the close proximity of the crowd to the jury, id. at
181-83, 186, 192 (describing several instances of crowd members directly haranguing
the jury during recesses); the court's conference with the chief of police of Atlanta
and the colonel of the regiment stationed in Atlanta in the sight of the jury, see
supra text accompanying note 34; the postponement of the conclusion of the case at
the suggestion of the press, see supra text accompanying note 33; the disorderly conditions accompanying the reception of the verdict; the defendant's absence from the
courtroom (as quoted in text); and the joyous demonstration that greeted Dorsey as
he left the courtroom. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 56.
The ground of error concludes: "This defendant contends that the above recital
shows that he did not have a fair and impartial jury trial," and refers the court to
a number of affidavits detailing the events. Transcript of Record at 148, Frank (No.
775).
At a later point, Frank argued in a brief that this assignment of error, "merely relates to the proposition that the trial was not a fair and impartial one. It recounts various episodes attending the trial and incidentally states that the prisoner
was not present at the rendition of the verdict, his counsel having waived his presence. It requires no argument to indicate that this was not the presentation of the
constitutional question" of whether due process was violated by the rendition of a
verdict in his absence. See Says Frank Verdict Was Legal Nullity, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
2, 1914, at 8. The context for this brief is further described infra note 77 and accompanying text.
49. See Frank, 80 S.E. at 1034-35; DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 78. The most
detailed description of the contents of these affidavits is to be found in newspaper
accounts, see e.g., Detailed Denial of Every Charge Made by Henslee, ATLANTA J.,
Oct. 21, 1913, at 1. The Georgia Supreme Court describes them only generally, and
they are not in the Transcript of Record, supra note 32, since counsel did not include them in Frank's federal habeas corpus petition. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 318.
The State criticized this omission in its brief, see Brief of Hugh M Dorsey,
Warren Grice [for Appellee] at 16, Frank v. Magnum 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (No. 775);
infra text accompanying note 94, and the Court majority implicitly agreed, see
Frank, 237 U.S. at 333, 336, 344. Dissenting, Justices Holmes and Hughes asserted
that petitioner had no obligation to set forth the State's evidence, see id. at 349. See
also infra note 108 (discussing this issue).
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The trial judge denied the new trial motion.5" In the course
of addressing the assertion that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence, he stated, as Frank's lawyers recounted
to the Georgia Supreme Court:
[TIhat the jury had found the defendant guilty; that he, the judge,
had thought about this case more than any other he had ever
tried; that he was not certain of the defendant's guilt; that with
all the thought he had put on this case he was not thoroughly
convinced whether Frank was guilty or innocent, but that he did
not have to be convinced; that the jury was convinced; that there
was no room to doubt that; that he felt it his duty to order that
the motion for new trial be overruled."5 1
Today at least, the weight of the historical record supports
the view that the judge believed that Frank was probably innocent but feared an outbreak of mob violence if he granted a new
trial-which would in any event take place while the public was
still aroused-and hoped that there would be a reversal in the
Georgia Supreme Court,5 2 leading to an eventual new trial in a
calmer atmosphere.5 3
On appeal, Frank's lawyers argued that the judge's remarks
showed that he had failed to "sanctify [the] verdict by exercising
that discretion which the law demands," but rather had "put
forward the discretion of the jury as an excuse for not exercising
his own."'

50. See Frank, 80 S.E. at 1034.
51. Id. Dinnerstein and Golden each set forth slightly different versions of these
comments. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 79; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 233.
52. Indeed, one Atlanta newspaper predicted editorially that the judge's expression of doubt would have just this effect. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 79-80.
53. See id. at 80-81; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 232-33. But the evidence for
this view-including evidence that "Conley's court-appointed lawyer . . . told the
judge that Conley had confessed the murder to him," id. at 253-has emerged slowly
over time. At least one contemporary courtroom observer thought that the judge's remarks were merely an effort to placate the defense lawyer arguing before him. See
DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 173-74. See generally Eric M. Freedman, Innocence,
Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two Legislative Proposals for Evaluating PostTrial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 315, 316 (1990-91) (describing "general tendency of evidence of innocence to
emerge only at a relatively late stage in capital proceedings").
54. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 163-65 (reprinting excerpt from appellate
brief); see id. at 81 (reporting that oral argument centered on this issue).
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However, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument; it ruled that a trial court's "legal judgment [is] expressed
in overruling the motion... and, if there is sufficient evidence
to support the verdict, this court will not interfere because of the
judge's oral expression as to his opinion."'
With respect to the manifestations of public hostility, the
court wrote that, in light of the conflicting evidentiary presentations of the two sides on the motion, the judge "was authorized
to find from the evidence submitted that only two instances
occurred within the hearing or knowledge of the jury," and those
two, it held, were "insufficient to impugn the fairness of the

trial."
The court then turned to the tumult during the polling of

the jury:
In order that the occurrence complained of shall have the effect of
absolutely nullifying the poll of the jury taken before they dispersed, it must appear that its operation upon the minds of the
jury, or some of them, was of such a controlling character that
they were prevented, or likely to have been prevented, from giving a truthful answer to the questions of the court. We think that
the affidavits of jurors submitted in regard to this occurrence
were sufficient to show that there was no likelihood that there
was any such result.'
Rejecting also the instructional' and evidentiary" arguments on state law grounds, the court affirmed the conviction.'

55. Frank, 80 S.E. at 1034.
56. Id. at 1033-34. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 313-14 (1915) (accurately summarizing this passage).
57. Frank, 80 S.E. at 1033.
58. Id. at 1030-31.
59. This aspect of the case, which occupied the bulk of the court's opinion, see
id. at 1019-30, drew a dissent from two of the six Justices. The dissenters argued at
length, see id at 1034-44, that the testimony of Conley and others "tending to show
independent acts of lasciviousness on the part of Frank or improper conduct of his
with other parties at other times, was inadmissible" and "certainly calculated to
prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors, and thereby deprive him of a
fair trial," id at 1044.
60. One of the consultants assisting on the case was Louis Marshall, the President of the American Jewish Committee, and a prominent constitutional lawyer, who
would eventually argue Frank's case in the Supreme Court. See DINNERSTIN, supra
note 22, at 91. Commenting on this opinion, he observed that he was "satisfied that
the man is absolutely innocent" and continued:
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While awaiting this decision, which they anticipated would
be favorable, Frank's attorneys had been vigorously engaged in
further investigation, resulting in a great deal of new evidence
supporting their case and undermining the veracity of the
prosecution's witnesses.'
After they presented this in an "extraordinary motion for a
new trial" based on newly-discovered evidence,6 2 the prosecution induced some of its recanting witnesses to return to their
original accounts and attacked some of the other new evidence
as having been obtained by bribery.' Following an evidentiary
hearing, a newly-seated judge denied the motion,' an action
that the Georgia Supreme Court in due course routinely affirmed as not constituting an abuse of discretion.65
Separate counsel representing Frank also filed a motion to
set aside the verdict as a nullity on the theory that the state and
federal constitutions had been violated by his absence from the
courtroom at the time of its rendition.6 6 This motion was made
on April 16, 1914,67 at about the same time as the one based on

I was very much disappointed with the decision. It is unsound in law. Unfortunately the court could not pass upon the facts, and was confined to a
consideration of the exceptions taken to the rulings of the trial court on the
admission and rejection of evidence, and to the charge to the jury.
Letter from Louis Marshall to Siegmund B. Sonneborn (Mar. 13, 1914), reprinted in
1 LOUIS MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY 297-98 (Charles Reznikoff ed. 1957).
61. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 84-90, 102-05; GOLDEN, supra note 22,
at 200-03, 228-31, 238-40.
62. See Frank, 83 S.E. at 234 (describing procedure), see also Governor John M.
Slaton's Commutation Order (June 21, 1915), reprinted in GOLDEN, supra note 22, at
312, 332-34, 341 (discussing evidence presented on this motion and observing that "it
is well known that it is almost a practical impossibility to have a verdict set aside
by this procedure").
63. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 103-05. There is today substantial reason to believe that the prosecution engaged in pervasive misconduct in obtaining this
material. See id. at 103; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 238-39; supra note 29; see also
Freedman, supra note 53, at 316 n.6 (observing that the pressures of capital cases
often "lead law enforcement officers to cut constitutional corners").
64. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 104-05.
65. Frank, 83 S.E. at 233.
66. See supra text accompanying note 33. Separate counsel were engaged to
pursue this issue because the original trial counsel "had promised Hugh Dorsey that
they would not use their client's absence during part of the judicial proceedings as a
basis for future appeals . . . [and] felt obliged to honor their pledge," DINNERSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 91.
67. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 315 (1915).
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the new evidence.' In demurring, the State argued, among other things, that the challenge should have been included in
Frank's original motion for a new trial. 9 The Georgia Supreme
Court, rejecting Frank's claim that its prior decisional law was
to the contrary, accepted this argument and held that imposing
such a procedural requirement was consistent with the state and
federal constitutions.7 ° On November 18, 1914, the Georgia Supreme Court denied Frank a writ of error for the purpose of
pursuing the federal issues to the United States Supreme
71

Court.
On November 21, 1914, Frank's counsel applied to Justice

Lamar, the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, for a writ of
68. A minor but irritating mystery in the case is the exact date on which the
"extraordinary motion" based on newly-discovered evidence, see supra text accompanying note 62, was filed. Dorsey, who surely knew the answer, said in his brief to
the Supreme Court that the Frank filings had "not disclosed when this extraordinary
motion was filed, but it was presumably filed before or certainly at the time the
motion to set aside the verdict was filed," Brief of Hugh M. Dorsey, Warren Grice
[for Appellee] at 11, Frank v. Magnum, 37 U.S. 309 (1915) (No. 775).
The point is of more than pedantic interest, because the interplay between the
two motions was the subject of some strategic discussion among defense counsel. The
Atlanta lawyers wanted to file the motion based on new evidence first, and feared
that its impact would be dissipated by the simultaneous pursuit of a motion based
on a purely legal theory. From New York, Marshall "vigorously dissented from their
view," DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 90.
Marshall argued that the two motions would reinforce each other: A court
would be disposed to look more favorably on the newly discovered evidence if the
regularity of the underlying proceedings seemed questionable, and the constitutional
attack would benefit from the showing that there was substantial doubt as to the
justice of the outcome of the trial. On the other hand, if the lawyers waited to file
the constitutional challenge until after the new evidence motion had been adversely
disposed of, they would appear to be filing successive proceedings for the purpose of
delay. See id. at 90-91.
Since Dinnerstein quotes Marshall as making these arguments in a letter
dated March 25, 1914, the new evidence motion was presumably filed some time
after that but not later than April 16, 1914, which is consistent with Dorsey's statement quoted in the first paragraph of this note.
This suggests that the Letter from Louis Marshall to Henry Alexander (May
23, 1914), reprinted in Louis MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY, supra note 60, at
298, in which Marshall eloquently makes the same arguments in extenso to another
one of the local counsel, is mis-dated (and was perhaps written on March 23, 1914).
69. See Frank, 83 S.E. at 648 (setting forth all eight grounds for the demurrer).
The trial court's ruling upheld the State's position in its entirety. Id. at 646. Frank's
original new trial motion is described supra text accompanying notes 39-51.
70. See id. at 648-52.
71. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 317; Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 7; Brief
of Hugh M. Dorsey, Warren Grice [for Appellee] at 5, Frank (No. 775).
1
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error granting Supreme Court review. 72 He denied it on November 23, in a memorandum opinion which stated:
The decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in this case holds
that, under the laws of that State where a motion for a new trial
was made and denied, the defendant could not thereafter make a
motion to set aside the verdict on the ground that he was not
present when it was returned by the jury. That ruling involves a
matter of State practice and presents no Federal question. The
writ of error is therefore denied."3
Frank then exercised his right to apply for the same relief to
Justice Holmes, who denied it on November 25, 1914. 7 ' His
memorandum opinion stated:
I understand that I am to assume that the allegations in the
motion to set aside are true. On those facts I very seriously doubt
if the petitioner has had due process of law-not on the ground of
his absence when the verdict was rendered so much as because of
the trial taking place in the presence of a hostile demonstration
and seemingly dangerous crowd, thought by the presiding judge
to be ready for violence unless a verdict of guilty was rendered. I
should not feel prepared to deny a writ of error if I did not consider that I was bound by the decision of the supreme court of Georgia that the motion to set aside came too late ... I think I am
bound by this decision, even if it reverses a long line of cases and
the counsel for petitioner were misled to his detriment, which I do
not intimate to be my view of the case. I have the impression that
there is a case in which the ground that I rely on as showing
want of due process of law was rejected by the court with my
dissent, but I have not interrupted discussion with counsel to try
to find it, if it exists.75

72. See Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 7; Brief of Hugh M. Dorsey,
Warren Grice [for Appellee] at 5, Frank (No. 775).
73. Frank v. Georgia, Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 8, 9 (Lamar, Circuit Justice 1914), reprinted in Justice to Frank Doubted by Holmes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1914, at 1.
74. See Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 7; Brief of Hugh M. Dorsey,
Warren Grice [for Appellee] at 5, Frank (No. 775); Justice to Frank Doubted by
Holmes, supra note 73, at 1.
75. Frank v. Georgia, Transcript of Record at 13, Frank (No. 775) (Holmes, Circuit Justice 1914), reprinted in Justice to Frank Doubted by Holmes, supra note 73,
at 1. The opinion was also published in Holmes Denies Motion to Set Aside Verdict,
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 27, 1914, at 5. I have so far been unable to locate a case
such as that which Holmes describes in his final sentence.
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According to Holmes, this memorandum was written
for any other of our Judges in the case he applied to another as
he had a right to. To my surprise the mem. was published and as
it seems the case had excited much attention though I never had
heard of it the papers talk about it and I get letters from sensitive females crying for mercy... I am somewhat annoyed at the
publication as I wrote what was intended only as a suggestion to
my brethren if any of them could see a way to giving relief.7"
At this point, Marshall applied to the full Court." Justices
Holmes and Hughes thought "that the writ ought to be granted,"7' but it was denied on December 7, 1914 without recorded
dissent.7 9

76. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Clare Castletown (Nov. 28,
1914); see also infra note 114 (quoting additional portions of letter).
This letter, like all the Holmes letters cited in this Article, is to be found in
the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers (University Publications of America) (originals in the Library of Congress).
Holmes' relationships with his various female correspondents are discussed in
JOHN S. MONAGAN, THE GRAND PANJANDRUM 65-94 (1988).

On Holmes' ruling, and the adverse editorial reaction to it, see DINNERSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 109-110; As Press Sees Frank Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1914, at 8
(quoting sampling of editorial opinions nationally).
77. See Memorandum from Louis Marshall to Chief Justice Edward D. White
(Nov. 24, 1914), reprinted in LOUIS MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY, supra note

60, at 299. This memorandum summarizes Marshall's arguments to the effect that
the right to be present at the reception of a jury verdict is "a part of due process,. . . which cannot be waived" and that the decision of the Georgia Supreme
Court changing its rule so as to provide that a challenge on these grounds should
be made by a motion for a new trial rather than a motion to set aside the verdict
"was a violation of the ex post facto clause" and "in fact an attempt to evade the
fundamental constitutional question, which, under the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, was incapable of being waived." Id. at 302-03. Subsequently, Marshall filed a fuller brief, substantial portions of which were reprinted in
Says Frank Verdict Was Legal Nullity, supra note 48, at 8.
78. They reported this the following April in their opinion in Frank v. Magnum,
237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes & Hughes, JJ., dissenting). The reason for Holmes'
change of view is not apparent, but it is possible that in the interval since the writing of his memorandum quoted supra text accompanying notes 74-75, he had read
Marshall's filings described supra note 77.
In any event, it appears from the cited passage in Frank that these Justices
wished to grant the writ of error to consider Frank's claim concerning his absence
from the rendition of the verdict, apparently on the theory that this was error correctable by writ of error, but not of constitutional magnitude, and so not cognizable
on habeas corpus. See infra notes 89, 105.
79. In re Frank, 235 U.S. 694 (1914).
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On December 17, 1914, Frank applied to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for a writ of
habeas corpus." The principal contention was that his absence
from the courtroom at the rendition of the verdict was, under
the circumstances, a denial of due process,8 but the petition also asserted that the "trial did not proceed in accordance with the
orderly processes of the law ... because [it was] dominated by a
mob which was hostile to me, and whose conduct intimidated
the Court and jury," in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and Equal Protection. 2
As Marshall had anticipated,83 the District Court denied

80. The full petition is contained in Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 1-9.
81. See id. at 8.
82. Id.
83. See Letter from Louis Marshall to Meier Steinbrink (Dec. 19, 1914), reprinted in Louis MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY, supra note 60, at 303 (reporting
that the application for writ of habeas corpus had been made to the District Court,
and "[t]here is every likelihood that that application will be denied.").
Marshall's purpose in writing was to urge the cancellation of a planned rally
"for the purpose of protesting against the action of courts and urging Executive
clemency." Id. One basis for his position was that he wished "to have the court to
understand that the responsibility rests upon it, and that it cannot be shifted upon
the shoulders of the Governor of Georgia," id. at 303-04; see also Letter from Louis
Marshall to Simon Wolf (Sept. 27, 1913), reprinted in id. at 296 (discouraging Wolf
from a proposed press campaign).
At other times, Marshall was active in enlisting public support, notably that of
The New York Times, see DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 91-94; see also Letter from
Leo M. Frank to Adolph Ochs (Nov. 20, 1914), reprinted in RICHARD F. SCHEPARD,
THE PAPER'S PAPERS 198-99 (1996) (thanking publisher of the New York Times for
recent supportive editorials; pending post-trial proceeding is not a technicality but
"invokes a basic human right," seeking a determination "whether or not an unruly
mob, operating in an atmosphere of smoldering violence and prejudice, may, with
impunity and the apparent seal of judicial approval, invade our courts and compel
verdicts"). See generally SUSAN E. TIFFT & ALEX S. JONES, THE TRUST 92-97 (1999)
(describing Ochs' involvement).
In light of the enormous public interest in the case, see DINNERSTEIN, supra
note 22, at 114-19 (describing movement to have Frank's sentence commuted that
began in fall of 1914 and continued until successful); LINDEMANN, supra note 22, at
268 ("Throughout the United States, large numbers of Americans . . . responded as
if this was . ..
a horrible miscarriage of justice, unthinkable in the United
States-or perhaps possible only in the bigoted South. There was an enormous outpouring of letters, over one hundred thousand at final count, . . . urging that
Frank's sentence be commuted."), Marshall probably had fairly limited control over
the details and timing of the various forms of public agitation. See Letter from Louis Marshall to "A Country Law Student" (May 7, 1915), reprinted in Louis MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY, supra note 60, at 312 ("[Y]our communication [to
Governor Slaton of Georgia] is a bungling, mischievous and stupid performance. If
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the application.' 4 Frank then applied to Justice Lamar for a
certificate of probable cause to appeal. On December 28, 1914,
Justice Lamar granted the application.' His printed opinion
provided to counsel recited the procedural history and then continued as follows-with the omission of the bracketed phrase,
which he had stricken from his typed draft:"
[T]he application for the certificate is not to be determined by any
views which may be held as to the effect of the final judgment of
the State Supreme Court refusing a New Trial, [or by the effect of
the Supreme Court of the United States refusing a writ of error
to review the judgment refusing to Set Aside the verdict,] but by
considering whether the nature of the constitutional right assert-

you had a desire to murder Frank, you could not have accomplished that purpose in
a more effective manner.... If the letter has not gone forward, I insist, as Frank's
counsel, that you withhold it. If it has, . . . telegraph to the Governor to return it
to you").
84. If the State filed a written response to the application, it does not appear in
Transcript of Record, supra note 32.
The District Court's ruling, issued by Judge William T. Newman on December
21, 1914, is reprinted in id. at 14-15. The decision reviewed the prior course of
proceedings and continued,
If this writ should issue . . . the only thing the Court here could do would be
to hear evidence and determine whether this applicant had been denied the
equal protection of the laws and due process of law, and consequently should
be discharged. It seems to me that this would be the exercise by this Court of
supervisory power over the action of the State courts in a manner not warranted by the Constitution or the Laws of the United States. Also the Court
would be considering the matter . . . in the face of the decisions of two Justices of the Supreme Court-indeed of the entire Court--to the effect . . . that
no Federal question remained for consideration or now exists in the case.
I&. at 15.
85. See Transcript of Record at 229, Frank (No. 775) (Lamar, Circuit Justice
1914); see also id. at 21 (District Court order denying certificate). The statement in
ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GoV-

ERNMENT, 1910-21, at 363 (1984) (Volume 9 of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court of the United States) that Justice Lamar's memorandum "was widely published in the press," is correct, see, e.g., Lamar Grants Appeal
to Frank, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1914. at 1 (reprinting text of opinion). The authors'
further statement that the document "is not otherwise preserved," BICKEL &
SCHMIDT, supra, is not correct. In addition to the printed copy in Transcript of Record, Frank (No. 775) there exists the documentation discussed infra note 86 and accompanying text.
86. This draft is to be found in case file of Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309
(1915), in the Washington facility of the National Archives and Record Administration, Records Group 267, U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Case file No. 24519, Box
4690. The significance of the deletion is discussed infra note 104. The same folder
also contains a clean typescript version of the opinion.
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ed in the absence of any decision expressly foreclosing the right to
an appeal, leaves the matter so far unsettled as to constitute
probable cause justifying the allowance of the appeal.
The Supreme Court of the United States has never determined whether, on a trial for murder in a State court, the due
process clause of the Federal Constitution guarantees the defendant a right to be present when the verdict is rendered.
Neither has it decided the effect of a final judgment refusing
a New Trial in a case where the defendant did not make the fact
of his absence when the verdict was returned a ground of the
Motion, nor claim that the rendition of the verdict in his absence
was the denial of a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Nor has it passed upon the effect of its own refusal to grant
a writ of error in a case where an alleged jurisdictional question
was presented in a Motion filed at a time not authorized by the
practice of the State where the trial took place. Such questions
are all involved in the present case, and since they have never
been settled by any authoritative ruling by the full court ... the
appeal [is] allowed.87

The parties filed simultaneous briefs on the merits." While
naturally beginning with the disorderly conditions at trial,89

87. Transcript of Record, supra note 32, at 230. This decision "met with general
newspaper acclaim," DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 111.
88. See Frank Brief Filed in Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1915, § 2, at
11; Answers Frank Brief, id. (reporting on State's brief). The Supreme Court's date
stamp records Marshall's brief as having been filed on Feb. 20, 1915, and Dorsey's
on February 23.
89. See Appellant's Argument at 3-8, Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)
(No. 775). The ultimate conclusion of this discussion was that Frank was not tried
by a "court" in the legal sense (thus stating a jurisdictional attack cognizable on
habeas corpus, Appellant's Argument at 114-31, Frank (No. 775). This argument is
stated with considerable force and eloquence in id. at 82-93, e.g., id. at 84:
There was no longer a court or a jury. They were as though they had never
been. There ceased to be a trial or a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard.
For all practical purposes, the court might as well have handed the appellant
over to the tender mercies of the boisterous bystanders who were clamoring
for his blood . . .
The argument was much more solid than it might appear at first glance,
because-as convincingly detailed in 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 7, § 2.4(d)-(e)
-a "jurisdictional" attack in the habeas corpus sense is simply one that raises fundamental (including constitutional) issues, as distinguished from a "merely legal"
claim that does not implicate basic concerns of procedural or substantive fairness.
See, e.g., infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of
Frank's claim of absence from rendition of verdict); see also infra note 104.
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Marshall was careful to conclude by assuring the Court that the
appropriate relief was retrial, not release.' On the procedural
issues, Marshall argued that the District Court had "entirely
misconceived"9 1 the significance of Frank's recent efforts to obtain a writ of error from the Justices:9 2
The reason for the denial of a writ of error by this Court, and
its several members, was not that a Federal question was not
involved in the case, but that the Supreme Court of Georgia put
its decision upon two grounds, (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution vas not violated, and (2) that in any
event it was too late to raise that question....
..

[Since] each of the grounds was a sufficient basis, .

.

. this

Court held... [that] a writ of error... would not lie... Our
hope was, to satisfy the Court that the two grounds stated were
not independent of one another, but interdependent, and...
amounted, in substance, to a determination... that, by his nonaction or acquiescence [appellant] had waived a constitutional
right which, it had been held by this Court, could not be waived
expressly. It is evident, however, that the view prevailed here,
that the Supreme Court of Georgia, whether right or wrong, had
determined that the proper remedy was a motion for a new trial,
and not a motion to set aside the verdict.
Our present proceeding, an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, is... based upon the proposition that, because the appellant was ...

deprived of due process of law ....

the court had lost

jurisdiction. That presents a proposition which is not affected by
State practice. The case is in the precise situation that it would

All the arguments of Marshall's brief proceeded from record materials or legal
authority; it contained no suggestion that an evidentiary hearing was needed. Marshall told the Court on oral argument that this was "a case where there is no dispute as to the facts," see Frank Case Appeal Arguments Ended, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27,
1915, at 8. Cf supra note 84 (quoting opinion of District Judge that grant of writ
would necessarily entail a hearing to determine whether Frank's rights had in fact
been violated at trial); infra note 96 (describing State's position).
90. See Appellants Argument at 157-65, Frank (No. 775). This was a considered
tactical choice, based on Marshall's belief that, as he wrote to Albert D. Lasker (a
"Jewish advertising genius from Chicago" who was one of Frank's active supporters,
see DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 92), "it would be far easier to succeed, if the
Court were satisfied that a favorable decision would not finally discharge Frank."
Letter from Louis Marshall to Albert D. Lasker (Jan. 30, 1915), quoted in id. at
111.
91. Appellants Argument at 154, Frank (No. 775).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
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have been if no timely proceeding had been attempted in the
State courts of Georgia... In that event, the bare question presented in this proceeding would have been, Did the court possess
jurisdiction to pronounce sentence of death? That is the exact
condition that now exists. That is the same question which must
now be answered... [A]ppellant's unavailing attempts in the
State court for relief.., cannot make that a legal judgment
which was before a nullity.'

Dorsey argued that, in light of Frank's failure to submit the
State's rebuttal affidavits -and the asserted inadmissibility of
oral evidence in habeas corpus proceedings to show a lack of
jurisdiction in the convicting court9 5-the factual determinations of the State courts should be presumed correct.96 Further,
inasmuch as Frank had already obtained rulings from the State
courts on every issue presented, those rulings should be consid97 Even if not so considered, he continued, the
ered res judicata.
errors alleged were not fundamental enough to justify habeas relief. 8 This argument in various forms occupied much of the
greater part of his brief; the argument that Frank was precluded
by the denial of the writ of error was made briefly and awkwardly."

93. Appellant's Argument at 154-57, Frank (No. 775). A premise of this argument is that the requirement of "the exhaustion of remedies in the State courts
cannot be said to be a jurisdictional condition precedent to the institution of habeas
corpus proceedings in the Federal Courts," id. at 147, but is rather a discretionary
doctrine of comity, id. at 131-33. Accordingly, in the section preceding the one from
which the quote in text is drawn, id. at 131-54, Marshall, seeking the favorable
exercise of discretion, argued at length the legal reasonableness under previouslyexisting State law of "a most strenuous and earnest effort to obtain review," id. at
147, that had been made in the Georgia courts, Appellant's Argument at 147-54,
Frank (No. 775).
94. See Brief of Hugh M. Dorsey at 16, Frank (No. 775). See also supra note 49
and accompanying text.
95. See Brief of Hugh M. Dorsey at 50-51, Frank (No. 775).
96. See id. at 16. On oral argument, counsel for the State, challenging Marshall,
made every effort to present the facts as being in dispute. See Frank Case Appeal
Arguments Ended, supra note 89.
97. See Brief of Hugh M. Dorsey at 46-49, Frank (No. 775).
98. See id. at 51-68, 74-81.
99. See id. at 71-74. While the topic heading of the brief states the proposition,
neither the text nor the cases it cites support the argument, although supportive
case law was available. See 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 7, § 2.4d, at 54-57 (describing Supreme Court cases in wake of Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), as
establishing after 1892 an increasingly strict rule that constitutional claims of state
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The Supreme Court's opinion was delivered on April 19,
1914. l"c By a vote of 7-2, with Justices Holmes and Hughes
dissenting, the Court affirmed the denial of the writ.1"' The
Justices agreed that:
(a) the District Court did have the authority
" 1 2 to hold a hearing "to test the jurisdiction of the state court; 1
(b) the determinations of the state courts were not res judi0 3 nor were Frank's claims precluded by his prior unsuccata,1
cessful applications for a writ of error;1'
prisoners were to be reviewed by writ of error, if meaningfully available, rather than
habeas corpus); see also infra note 104 and accompanying text (describing the
Court's disposition of the argument).
100. The date of April 12, 1914 given in the U.S. Reports, see Frank v. Magnum,
237 U.S. 309 (1915), is incorrect, as the Court's Journal shows. See also Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Ellen A. (Mrs. Charles P.) Curtis (Apr. 19, 1915), Oliver
Wendell Holmes Papers, Jr. supra note 76 ("just going off to Court for a fight in the
Frank case"); DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 112; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 235
n.*.
101. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
102. Id. at 331. The passage continues by describing as one of the
established rules and principles . . . that it is open to the courts of the United States upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond
forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, to the extent of deciding whether the prisoner has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law, and for this purpose to inquire into jurisdictional facts, whether
they appear upon the record or not...."
Id. See supra note 89 (discussing meaning of "jurisdictional").
103. See id. at 334.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79. While it seems clear enough that
Justice Lamar had originally entertained some doubts on this subject, see supra text
accompanying notes 86-87, the point was rejected without explicit discussion, a
course doubtless facilitated by the weakness of Dorsey's brief on the issue, see supra
note 99 and accompanying text.
Although the Court cited the relevant cases, it silently confined them to their
facts, merely observing that
(a) habeas corpus review should ordinarily follow writ of error review, Frank
237 U.S. at 328-29; and
(b) the writ of habeas corpus "cannot be employed as a substitute for the writ
of error," id. at 326, a reiteration of the uncontested and uncontroversial distinction
between "[m]ere errors in point of law, however serious," id., which could only be
reviewed by writ of error, and the fundamental or "jurisdictional" (particularly constitutional) claims cognizable on habeas corpus, see id. at 327; supra note 78.
In thus reaffirming its pre-1892 practice, see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 7,
§ 2.4d, at 49 n.172 (listing Supreme Court cases granting habeas corpus review of
claims previously rejected on writ of error); supra note 99, the Court sent a significant, albeit silent, message. The decision to review the merits necessarily implied at
least that writ of error proceedings would not be preclusive where the Court had
found itself unable to reach the federal merits due to an adequate and independent
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(c) Frank's challenge to his absence from the verdict did not
rise to the level of a constitutional claim; 10 5
(d) there was no merit to the assertion that the Ex Post
Facto Clause was violated by the alleged change of view on the
part of the Georgia Supreme Court respecting the appropriate
procedure for bringing that claim."
Moreover, the Justices also agreed that "if a trial is in fact
dominated by a mob, so that the jury is intimidated and the trial
judge yields... there is, in that court, a departure from due
process of law."1 7 The critical disagreement was what showing
a habeas corpus petitioner had to make for a successful invocation of the District Court's conceded authority to determine
whether the trial court had "in fact" been intimidated.
The majority wrote that the facts concerning this issue as
found by the state court of last resort
must be taken as setting forth the truth of the matter, certainly
until some reasonable ground is shown for an inference that the

state ground. Cf supra text accompanying note 87 (In granting appeal, Justice
Lamar noted that the Court had not previously "passed upon the effect of its own
refusal to grant a writ of error in a case where an alleged jurisdictional question
was presented in a MIotion filed at a time not authorized by the practice of the
State where the trial took place."); supra text accompanying note 93 (setting forth
Marshall's argument that because denial of the writ of error had rested upon the
existence of an independent state procedural ground supporting the judgment, it
posed no barrier to Supreme Court habeas corpus review); infra note 225 (discussion
of this issue in Moore).
More broadly, Professors Liebman and Hertz identify the Court's decision to
reach the merits as an important data point in the line of developments by which
the writ of error (a writ of right) gradually began to lose importance in favor of the
expanding writ of certiorari (a discretionary writ), see LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note
7, § 2.4d, at 53-55; infra note 261 (endorsing this view). Because the Court had
justified its preference for writ of error over habeas corpus review in the post-1892
period on the grounds that the former was available as of right, see LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra note 7, § 2.4d, at 54, the erosion of the writ of error "expanded the
use and widened the scope of habeas corpus review," id. at 54. (original emphasis
omitted).
105. See Frank, 237 U.S. at 343. As indicated, supra note 78, the dissenters
wrote that, in their view, the Court ought to have previously granted the writ of error to deal with this point, but continued, "we never have been impressed by the
argument that the presence of the prisoner was required by the Constitution of the
United States," Frank, 237 U.S. at 346 (Holmes & Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
106. See id. at 344 (ruling that the Ex Post Facto Clause, "as its terms indicate,
is directed against legislative action only, and does not reach erroneous or inconsistent decisions by the courts").
107. Id. at 335. See infra note 259 (quoting passage more fully).
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court which rendered it either was wanting in jurisdiction, or at
least erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction; and... the mere
assertion by the prisoner that the facts of the matter are other
than the state court upon full investigation determined them to
be will not be deemed sufficient to raise an issue respecting the
correctness of that determination."' 5
The dissent began its analysis by elaborating on the
Justices' common understanding that the district court did have
the power to conduct an independent fact review:
The only question before us is whether the petition shows on
its face that the writ of habeas corpus should be denied, or whether the District Court should have proceeded to try the facts.
We have held in a civil case that it is no defence to the assertion of the Federal right in the Federal court that the State has
corrective procedure of its own-that still less does such procedure draw to itself the final determination of the Federal question. Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 122, 123 [1915]. We
see no reason for a less liberal rule in a matter of life and death.
When the decision of the question of fact is so interwoven with
the decision of the question of constitutional right that the one
necessarily involves the other, the Federal court must examine
the facts. Kansas Southern Ry. v. C.H. Albers Commission Co.,
233 U.S. 573, 591 [1912].1'9 Nor. & West. Ry. v. Conley,... 236
U.S. 605 [1915.10 Otherwise, the right will be a barren one. It

108.

Id. at 336. The remainder of the sentence reads, "especially not, where the

very evidence upon which the determination was rested is withheld by him who
attacks the finding." Id.; see supra note 49. This aspect of the decision is appropriately criticized as "confused" by J.S. Waterman & E.E. Overton, Federal Habeas
Corpus Statutes and Moore v. Dempsey, 1 U. CH. L. REV. 307, 317-18 (1933), reprinted in 6 ARK. L. REV. 8, 16-17 (1952).
109. The cited passage reads,
While it is true that upon a writ of error to a state court we cannot review
its decision upon pure questions of fact, but only upon questions of law bearing upon the Federal right set up by the unsuccessful party, it equally is true
that we may examine the entire record, including the evidence, if properly incorporated therein, to determine whether what purports to be a finding upon
questions of fact is so involved with and dependent upon such questions of
law as to be in substance and effect a decision of the latter. That this is so is
amply shown by our prior rulings.
Kansas S. Ry. v. C.H. Albers Comm'n Co., 233 U.S. 573, 591 (1912).
110. The opinion in this case, which was before the Court on a railroad's writ of
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is significant that the argument for the State does not go so far
as to say that in no case would it be permissible on application
for habeas corpus to override the findings of fact by the state
If, however, the argument stops short of this, the
courts....
whole structure built upon the state procedure and decisions falls
to the ground."'

Observing that the petition showed
the judgment of the expert on the spot, of the judge whose business it was to preserve not only form but substance, to have been
that if one juryman yielded to the reasonable doubt he himself
later expressed in court as the result of most anxious deliberation, neither prisoner nor counsel would be safe from the rage of
the crowd,

the dissent found "the presumption overwhelming that the jury
responded to the passions of the mob," and the allegations of the
petition of sufficient gravity that the district court should have
held a hearing, "whatever the decision of the state court may
have been.""'
Justice Holmes was uncharacteristically direct as to Frank's
effect on him, alluding to the distressing facts of the case in a
number of letters,' chafing at the conflict between the de-

error from state court litigation challenging the federal constitutionality of legislatively-mandated rates, states:
So far as the findings are concerned, we have in the present case simply a
general, or ultimate, conclusion of fact which is set forth in the decree of the
state court; and it is necessary for us, in passing upon the Federal right
which the plaintiff in error asserted, to analyze the facts in order to determine whether that which purports to be a finding of fact is so interwoven
with the question of law as to be in substance a decision of the latter.
Norfolk & West Ry. Conley, 236 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1915).
111. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345, 347-48 (Holmes & Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
112. Id. at 349.
113. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to the Baroness Moncheur (July 6,
1915), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76; Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to John Henry Wigmore (Apr. 22, 1915) ("I am relieved at not having the worry of the Frank case longer on my mind."), id.; Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Ellen A. (Mrs. Charles P.) Curtis (Apr. 19, 1915), supra note
100; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Leslie Scott (Mar. 7, 1915) (describing the question in the case as "whether a trial for murder gave a man due process
of law when the hostile mob was so dangerous that the Judge advised the counsel
for the prisoner not to have him present or even to be present themselves when the
verdict was taken"), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76.
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mands of law and those of justice," 4 and describing his opinion
as "a dissent as to which I feel a good deal.""'
Once the Court's opinion came down, "defense lawyers immediately began working for executive clemency," co-ordinating
a massive legal and press campaign designed to secure a cornIn addition, Holmes must have sent a copy of his Frank opinion to Sir Frederick Pollock, as the latter wrote him a insightful paragraph of comment on the
outcome. See Letter from Frederick Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes (May 19,
1915), reprinted in 1 HOLMEs-POLLOCK LETTERS 226 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1941).
Perhaps relatedly, Holmes was also feeling somewhat "tired and discouraged"
at the time, around his 74th birthday on March 8, 1915, remarking on the "impalpable soft approaches of the enemy," death, Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Lady Ellen Askwith, (Mar. 3, 1915), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note
76, and taking comfort in his continuing speed at writing opinions as evidence that
he was keeping the enemy at bay, id. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Lewis Einstein (Apr. 10, 1915), reprinted in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS 112, 113
(1964) (James Bishop Peabody, ed.); Letter from Oliyer Wendell Holmes to the Baroness Moncheur (Feb. 28, 1915), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76
("A very well mannered old party, time ....
[Bly a by he lays a soft paw on your
sleeve, so gently. And then slowly, like the dog in Faust's study, he begins to swell,
and grow more like a tiger. And the door is locked and one must await his doings."); cf infra text accompanying note 271 (recording Brandeis' comment that
Holmes "is disturbed" if his opinions are held up by colleagues' requests for revisions).
Holmes could not "help wondering whether our judicial protection of bills of
rights against legislation may not be nearing its end. On the one hand I seem to
see and I lament a weakening of the realizing senses that the fundamentals of personal liberty are worth fighting for, and on the other I see great danger" as the
"judicial notion of freedom of contract" thwarts economic experimentation. Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (Dec. 18, 1914), Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76.
114. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Clare Castletown (Nov. 28,
1914), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76. In this letter, partially
quoted supra text accompanying note 76, Holmes expressed irritation at the public
outcry that he was prepared to let a man be hanged on a seeming technicality, the
public "knowing and caring nothing for the constitutional limits to our power."
115. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Apr. 10, 1915),
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 113, at 112. Holmes also commented that he
thought the opinion "is a composite performance and suffers rhetorically from being
the product of two hands," Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Ellen A- (Mrs.
Charles P.) Curtis (Apr. 19, 1915), supra note 100, and indeed Holmes and Hughes
seem to have worked closely together in drafting it, see 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES
EvANS HUGHES 289-90 (1951).
To some extent, the fact of there being a dissent at all is a measure of the
strength of the dissenters' feelings on the matter. At this period, the publication of
dissenting opinions was relatively rare; the Term in which Frank was decided saw
the publication of 273 opinions for the Court and 11 dissents. See WALTER F. PRATT,
JR., THE -SUPREME COURT UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910-1921, at 131
(1999).
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mutation to life imprisonment.1 1 On June 21, 1915-having
first made elaborate arrangements to move Frank secretly to a
distant prison for his protection against an outburst of violence"'-Governor Slaton issued his commutation order, the
bulk of which consisted of a detailed review of the unreliability
of the evidence against Frank." 8 Outraged, violent anti-Semitic mobs ravaged the state for over a week.'19
Shortly afterwards, Frank wrote a warm letter to Justice
Holmes: "I feel that you, as Judge, do not look for thanks. Yet, I
cannot but feel profoundly gratified, that.., you, and Justice
Hughes diagnosed the situation with rare insight and sagacity."2 ° After recounting the "deplorable" protests that had
116. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 117; supra note 83. Frank would have
preferred seeking a complete pardon, but his attorneys convinced him that a commutation request would be more prudent. See DINNERSTEIN, supra at 117.
117. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 126; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 265-66.
118. See Governor John M. Slaton's Commutation Order, supra note 62, at 31738. The Governor also had before him private information received indirectly from
Conley's lawyer to the effect that his client was the guilty party. See DINNERSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 170-71; cf supra note 53 (recounting similar information known to
trial judge)
In a public defense of the order, the Governor urged:
Judge Roan charged the jury that if they did not recommend to mercy
the defendant, which would carry life imprisonment as a penalty, he, Judge
Roan would be compelled to sentence the defendant to be hanged.
This was not the law. Judge Roan overlooked the statute which gave
him the discretion in the imposition of alternative penalties when the verdict
was founded on circumstantial evidence.
It is inconceivable that where Judge Roan doubted the guilt of the defendant at all he would have failed to impose the life sentence instead of the
death sentence if he had remembered his authority to do so....
The imposition of the penalty had passed beyond the trial Judge, because the term of court had passed, and he asked me to prevent an injustice
which might occur because of the Judge's oversight, and I exercised my power
to correct a mistake when I was the only one who had the power to correct
it.
John M. Slaton, Governor Slaton's Own Defense in the Frank Case, N.Y. WORLD,
July 4, 1915, Editorial Section, at 1. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 121, 125
(describing judge's letters to pardons board and Governor).
119. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 130-33; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 26874. Historians agree that this outburst had a profound effect on the Jewish community and its views on racial matters over the next several decades, although they
disagree on what that impact was. See Mark K. Bauman, Introduction to THE QUIET
VOICES: SOUTHERN RABBIS AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS, 1880S TO 1990s, at 2-4 & n.5
(Mark K. Bauman & Berkley Kalin eds., 1997).
For Marshall's reaction to the Governor's decision, see Marshall Praises
Slaton's Courage, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1915, at 7.
120. Letter from Leo M. Frank to Oliver Wendell Holmes (July 10, 1915), Oliver
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greeted the news of the commutation-sparked by "these same
people, this same crowd, the same shouts and threats, which
pervaded the atmosphere of my trial," thus verifying "that my
trial could not have approximated justice"-Frank closed by
expressing "confident trust" in his ultimate vindication, and
looking forward to the day when, "with liberty & honor restored,"
he could have the pleasure of greeting Holmes in per121
son.
Writing to a correspondent the day that he received this
letter, Holmes observed that it was "very well written, with a
surprising moderation of tone" and vowed to keep it. 122 Less
reliably, he is reported to have remarked that "a man who could
write to him so sensitively as Frank couldn't have raped and
murdered a girl.""
A month later, in a well-organized operation led by eminent
citizens, Frank was abducted from prison and lynched in Mary
Phagan's hometown.
III. FROM FRANK TO MOORE
Frank plainly aroused strong feelings, in the country at
large' 2 and among the Justices. 26
Louis D. Brandeis, then in private practice, urged Roscoe
Pound to write a letter of protest 127 and later referred to the

Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers supra note 76.

121. Id.
122. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Leslie Scott (July 13, 1915), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers supra note 76.

123. Memorandum of Talk [of Mark de Wolfe Howe] with F(elix] F[rankfurter]
(Aug. 10, 1964), Oliver Wendall Holmes Papers, Jr. supra note 76. Although there is

no particular reason to doubt the accuracy of this account, Frankfurter was 81 years
old at the time of his conversation with Howe, see Urofsky, infra note 267, at 299
n.2, and recounting a conversation with Holmes that would have taken place 49
years earlier.
124. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 139-42; GOLDEN, supra note 22, at 28089; Michael Dorman, 2 Murders in Georgia, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 1999, at A24.
125. See supra note 83.
126. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Ellen A. (Mrs. Charles P.) Curtis
(Apr. 19, 1915) ("just going off to Court for a fight in the Frank case"), supra note
100; supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
127. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Roscoe Pound (Nov. 27, 1914), reprinted in
3 LErrERs OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 373 (Melvin W. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds.,
1978) ("In talking with Frankfurter this morning about the Frank case and Justice
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case as an example of injustice in writing to Senator George
Sutherland."2 The Executive Committee of the American Bar
Association, at a meeting at which William Howard Taft was
present,'2 9 adopted a resolution condemning Frank's "willful
and deliberate murder... in a spirit of savage and remorseless
cruelty, unworthy of our age and time," as "an act of wanton
well calculated to promote lawlessness and anarsavagery...
30
chy."1
The succeeding years saw a number of changes in the comof
position of the Supreme Court-including the appointments
13
Brandeis, Sutherland, and Taft-with the following results:
Holmes' memorandum [see supra text accompanying note 75], he told me that you
were convinced that Frank had not had a fair trial, and that he was not guilty, and
that this was another Dreyfus case. It seems to me of great importance that you
should, in a public letter, give expression to your opinion on this subject. Your
standing among the lawyers of America is such that what you say men will heed,
and it is important that this protest should be made by a non-Jew."); see also Letter
from Louis D. Brandeis to Alfred Brandeis (Dec. 12, 1914), reprinted in 3 LETTERS
OF Louis D. BRANDEIS, supra at 383 ("The Jews are having a sad time-Frank included.") (editors' footnotes and emendations omitted).
128. See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to George Sutherland (Nov. 6, 1915), reprinted in 3 LETTERS OF LouIs D. BRANDEIS, supra note 127, at 632 (suggesting
that Joseph Hillstrom, the union organizer commonly known as "Joe Hill," had not
had a fair trial and continuing: "The occurrences in the Frank case subjected the
reputation of the Courts to severe strain; and if Hillstrom should be sentenced without having had a fair trial, that which we must regard as the foundation of law and
order will be seriously undermined.").
129. At the time, Taft was a law professor at Yale. He had served as President
of the American Bar Association in 1913-1914. See HERBERT S. DUFFY, WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFT 303-05 (1930). On Taft's earlier record with regard to racial issues,
see Needham David Charles, William Howard Taft, the Negro, and the White South,
1908-1912, at 314-18 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia
(Athens)) (available from University Microfilms).
130. Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Committee, American Bar Association
(Aug. 18, 1915), William Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress (Reel 18).
Within Georgia, however, popular opinion supported the lynch mob, not the
Governor. See DINNERSTEIN, supra note 22, at 129-33, 145-47; Maclean, supra note
22, at 946. The prevailing view at the time was "that mob violence protected society
from both lawbreakers and a criminal justice system that failed to carry out its
mandate." W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 100 (1993). But this attitude broke up with surprising rapidity over the following decade under the influence of a coalition of anti-lynching activists comprising "white businessmen dedicated to economic progress, white reformers
animated by a vision of Christian social justice, and black activists committed to
color-blind justice." Id. at 208-09. Among this group was the Governor, Hugh Dorsey.
See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at
57-58 (1980).
131. This table is adapted from RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH
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Table 1
The Frank Court
(April 19, 1915)

The Moore Court
(February 19, 1923)

Edward D. White, C.J.

William Howard Taft, C.J.

Joseph McKenna
Oliver Wendell Holmes
Willis Van Devanter
James C. McReynolds
Joseph R. Lamar
Charles E. Hughes
William R. Day
Mahlon Pitney

(Seated October 3, 1921)
Joseph McKenna
Oliver Wendell Holmes
Willis Van Devanter
James C. McReynolds
Louis D. Brandeis
(Seated June 5, 1916)
George Sutherland
(Seated October 2, 1922)
Pierce Butler
(Seated January 2, 1923)
[Vacant]

Thus, four of the eight Justices who would be deciding
Moore had ascended the bench since Frank. But one of these
was a replacement for one of the dissenters in that case, and the
known views of the new Justices "were not necessarily favorable" to the petitioners.'32 Posssibly, as Brandeis suggested lat145 (1988), but has been reorganized to clarify the changes in Court personnel, and
supplemented by the addition of the dates in the second column, which are drawn
from the prefatory matter to the relevant volumes of the United States Reports. See
260 U.S. iii, nn.5, 6 (1923) (Sutherland, Butler); 257 U.S. iii (1922) (Taft); 241 U.S.
iii, n.5 (1916) (Brandeis). The final seat in the second column is listed as vacant because, Justice Pitney was replaced by Edward T. Sanford, who was sworn in on
February 19, 1923, the day the Moore case was decided, "with the result that the
Moore case was decided by an eight-person Court." CORTNER, supra, at 145 & n.1.
For informal sketches of these five Justices and their working environment by a
Court page, see Austin Cunningham, The United States Supreme Court and Me, SUP.
CT. HIST. SOC. Q., Summer 1998, at 6. The departures of their predecessors are
discussed in DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT
THE END 87-93 (1999).
132. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 145. More specifically, the most salient factor
influencing the appointments of Taft, Sutherland and Butler was their perceived
skepticism regarding the validity of economic regulations under the Due Process
Clause, rather than their views on individual rights. See David M. Levitan, The
Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 74
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er, 1" the importance of the change was not so much the identity of the appointees as their relative newness to the bench; specifically, it may be that the raw realities of Southern justice
would come as a greater shock to the newer Justices than to
those who had been seeing
similar scenarios regularly presented
134
for (and denied) review.
Perhaps it is of significance that the problem of lynching
continued to gnaw at the national conscience. Although
lynchings had been declining steadily between 1900 and 1917,
World War I disrupted the status quo. Black men returned from
military service far less willing than they had once been to accept
quietly the indignities of Jim Crow. Whites met their new asser-

(1996); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986
DUKE L.J. 65, 65. See also DANIEL J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS AP-

POINTED 181 (1964) (discussing Butler nomination); DAVID H. BURTON, TAFr,
HOLMES, AND THE 1920s COURT 112-14 (1998) (describing Taft nomination). See
generally Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the

Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1491-92 (1998). For an extensive analysis of
Sutherland's views, see Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic
Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RIGHTS J. 1 (1997).

133. See infra text accompanying note 270.
134. As my colleague Richard K. Neumann commented on this passage in draft,
one could with equal plausibility adopt the opposite hypothesis-that Justices who
had more recently lived outside the ivory tower of the Court would be more familiar
with the realities of the world and more cynical about it. Indeed, one of the only
two recorded dissenters in Moore was George Sutherland, who had recently joined
the Court from a litigation practice, see Justice Clarke Out of Supreme Court; To

Work for League, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1922, at 1. And in our own day, it would
seem that the increased misgivings over time of Justices Stevens and Blackmun
regarding the death penalty were the result of greater and greater exposure to specific instances of injustice coming before them judicially. See Callins v. Collins, 127
510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("For more than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along
with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that
would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. [Footnote citing votes upholding death sentences as Court of Appeals judge
omitted] ....
I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the
death penalty experiment has failed.").
Like the issue of the influence of stare decisis, see infra note 282, well designed empirical studies could presumably illuminate this question, but to date the
interests of those studying the effects of length of Supreme Court service on voting
behavior have lain in other areas, see, e.g., Saul Brenner & Timothy M. Hagle,
Opinion Writing and Acclimation Effect, 18 POL. BEHAV. 235 (1996); Albert P.
Melone, Revisiting the Freshman Effect Hypothesis: the First Two Terms of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, 74 JUDICATURE 6 (1990).
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tiveness with increased violence. The number of black lynchings,
down to only 36 in 1917, leaped to 76 in 1919.135
One response came from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), which launched a highprofile (although ultimately unsuccessful) campaign in Washington between 1919 and 1923 for federal antilynching legislation. 36 "The agitation for a federal anti-lynching law," a contemporary observed, "may be another symptom of the flux in
social consciousness that accounts partially for the development
from Frank v. Magnum to Moore v. Dempsey." 1

135. MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER 8 (1987). See
DAVID J. GOLDBERG, DISCONTENTED AMERICA: THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1920S, at
92-97 (1999); STEWART E. TOLNAY & E.M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN
ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-1930, at 31 (1995) (noting the upsurge in
lynchings "during the few years following World War I, a period also characterized
by a resurgence of Klan activity in the South and a rise in nativism in the country
as a whole"); See also CHRISTOPHER ROBERT REED, THE CHICAGO NAACP AND THE
RISE OF BLACK PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, 1910-1966, at 47-48 (1997) (describing
Chicago race riot of July, 1919 that resulted in 38 deaths); Steven A. Holmes, Scholar Takes On His Toughest Study of Race, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at 1 (describing the May, 1921 race riot in "Tulsa when mobs of whites, jealous of the economic
success of blacks ...
went on a rampage, killing [more than 100] blacks, pillaging
and burning buildings, [and] even dropping dynamite from airplanes"); Brent Staples,
Unearthing a Riot, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 19, 1999, at 64, 67 (describing modem
aftermath of Tulsa riot and observing that it was "part of a national pattern during
the teens and 20's, when city after city exploded in the worst racial conflicts that
the country would ever see"); Brent Staples, Searching for Graves-And Justice-in
Tulsa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at A14; infra note 241 (noting that the District
Judge who ruled on the habeas corpus petition in Moore in the fall of 1921 was
from Oklahoma City). See generally LEON F. LiTWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND 280-319
(1999).
136. See ZANGRANDO, supra note 130, at 51-71.
137. Note, Mob Domination at a Trial as a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 3, at 250. See also CAROLYN WEDIN, INHERITORS OF THE SPIRIT:
MARY WHITE OVINGTON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE NAACP 197 (1998) (Ovington,
who chaired the NAACP Board, "believed that, even though the bill ultimately failed
to become federal law, the public notoriety the . . . campaign lent lynching was a
prime cause of the drastic drops in these horrible numbers after 1924."); cf James
W. Clarke, Without Fear or Shame: Lynching, Capital Punishment and the Subculture of Violence in the American South, 28 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 268, 284-85 (1998)
(suggesting that "perhaps the most important reason that lynching declined is that it
was replaced by a more palatable form of violence," viz., capital punishment).
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IV. THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN MOORE

Underlying Moore is not a single crime, but a massive race
riot that took place in the fall of 1919 in Phillips County, Arkansas, near the town of Elaine." How the outbreak originated
was sharply disputed.' 9 The local white establishment called
it an "insurrection"'14 0-the

product of an organization of vio-

lent radicals14 1 and the machinations of an unscrupulous char-

138. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 2. This work, based heavily on primary
sources, is plainly the best account of the events leading to Moore. The author, who
believes that Moore represented a transformation of due process doctrine that repudiated Frank, see CORTNER, supra, at 1-2, 154, draws his title from the concluding
words of the Frank dissent: "[I]t is our duty . . . to declare lynch law as little valid
when practiced by a regularly drawn jury as when administered by one elected by a
mob intent on death," Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 350 (1915) (Holmes &
Hughes, JJ., dissenting).
Two works written relatively close to the time of the events by the Dean and
an Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas Law School, who had the benefit of assistance from various local officials, provide careful recountings of the procedural history (as well as a generally sympathetic view of the State's legal position).
J.S. Waterman & E.E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 18 ST. LOUIS
L. REV. 117 (1933), reprinted in 6 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1952); J.S. Waterman & E.E.
Overton, Federal Habeas Corpus Statutes and Moore v. Dempsey, supra note 108.
139. See Arkansas Riots Appeal Argued in Highest Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 10,
1923, at 17 (Blacks' contention is "that they had assembled in their church at Hoop
Spur to devise means as tenant farmers to relieve themselves of conditions which
they asserted amounted to peonage. While so assembled, the Negroes claimed, armed
white men surrounded the church and fired upon them, killing several. On behalf of
the state it is asserted the Negroes had assembled in connection with a plot to
massacre white men, and that the firing was done by a posse sent to quell a riot.").
These two conflicting versions persisted through the subsequent years, see Grif
Stockley, Scipio Africanus Jones, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 8, 1999, at El; see
also Michael Haddigan, Confronting the Past Conference Seeks to Revisit 1919 Race
Riot, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2000, at A3 (using occasion of academic conference on
riots to recount persisting racial divisions in county).
140. This was the conclusion of the Committee of Seven, a committee of prominent local citizens "formed with the approval of Governor [Charles H.] Brough to
investigate the riot and determine its cause," CORTNER, supra note 131, at 13.
The Committee reported its findings in a document entitled Inward Facts
About Negro Insurrection. This is to be found at 25-32 of the record annexed to the
Petition for Certiorari in Martineau v. Arkansas, 257 U.S. 665 (1921) (No. 525),
which was filed on Sept. 10, 1921 [hereinafter cited as Martineau Record]. This
petition and the accompanying papers are discussed more fully infra notes 185-86.
141. The Committee of Seven reported:
The present trouble with the negroes in Phillips county is not a race riot. It
is a deliberately planned insurrection of the negroes against the white[s], directed by an organization known as the 'Progressive Farmers' and Household
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latan who duped blacks into joining' 4 -- whose object, fortuitously disrupted before it could come to fruition, 4 3 was a general massacre of whites .by blacks.'" The NAACP took the
view, which is supported by modern scholarship, that the violence was an effort by whites to revenge and deter legal attacks
on an entrenched system of peonage. 4 ' In any event, between

Union of America,' established for the purpose of banding Negroes together for
the killing of white people.
Martineau Record, supra note 140, at 27. An argument in support of this viewpoint
is made by J.W. Butts & Dorothy James, The Underlying Cause of the Elaine Riot
of 1919, 20 ARK HIST. Q. 95 (1961).
It is worth recalling that, in addition to being a period of "bloody racial riots
in both North and South," coinciding with the return of servicemen from World War
I, the time of the riot was also that of the "Red Scare"; class-based strife was manifesting itself in violent disputes over working conditions, and in vigorous advocacy and even more vigorous suppression--of radical political and economic views. See
CARL H. MONEYHON, ARKANSAS AND THE NEW SOuTH, 1874-1929, at 107-08 (1997)
(locating Elaine riot within framework of farmworker attempts to unionize). See generally MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 612-14 (1988); supra text accompanying note 135.
As the riot was beginning, a lawyer seeking to meet with the tenant farmers
in the neighborhood was seized by vigilantes-who claimed to have taken from him
literature of the International Workers of the World ('IWW') as well as the Progressive Farmers Union-and held in jail for a month, partly for his own protection
from lynching;, he was then released, but, to appease the mob, indicted for barratry
(a charge that was dropped the following year). See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 3942; infra text accompanying note 198. Afterwards, the Arkansas authorities sought,
by complaint to the Post Office and by state court injunction proceedings, to prevent
the circulation of newspapers containing "untrue and seditious" accounts of the
Elaine riot and other contentious episodes. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 31-32.
142. See Martineau Record, supra note 140, at 27-31 (describing series of purported fund-raising schemes by this individual, Robert L. Hill, in which he "simply
played upon the ignorance and superstition of a race of children"). The attempts of
the authorities to return Hill to Arkansas from Kansas, where he had been arrested,
led to a sustained series of well-publicized legal and political maneuverings that
ultimately resulted in his being freed rather than extradited. See CORTNER, supra
note 131, at 55-83. As Professor Eric W. Rise of the Criminal Justice Program of the
University of Delaware highlighted in a paper entitled "The NAACP, Civil Rights,
and Criminal Extradition," which was presented at the 1998 meeting of the American Society for Legal History and is scheduled to see law review publication as part
of a larger joint project with Professor Paul Finkelman of the University of Tulsa
Law School, these efforts were part of a sustained political campaign undertaken by
the NAACP in the same period as its anti-lynching campaign, see supra text accompanying notes 136-37, and doubtless contributed as well to public views of Southern
justice.
143. See Inward Facts About Negro Insurrection, supra note 140, at 31.
144. See id. at 26, 27, 31.
145. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 27-28; FON LOUISE GORDON, CASTE &
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200 and 250 blacks and at least four whites were killed before
order was eventually restored by federal troops.148 In the wake
of the upheaval, 67 blacks were sentenced to prison terms and
12 to death, all for the murder of whites.14 7
The death sentences were returned within six weeks of the
riot in a series of trials in which jury deliberations lasted less
than ten minutes:

CLASS: THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN ARKANSAS, 1880-1920, at 136-37 (1995); JEANNIE
M. WHAYNE, A NEW PLANTATION SOUTH: LAND, LABOR, AND FEDERAL FAVOR IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ARKANSAs 75-77 (1996); O.A. Rogers, Jr., The Elaine Race Riots
of 1919, 19 ARK. HIST. Q. 142 (1960); see also Conference in Arkansas Re-examines
1919 Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at A28. For an excellent summary of the

historiography, see Jeannie M. Whayne, Race and Class in the 1919 Elain[e] Race
Riot, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAzETTE, Nov. 7, 1999, at J1.
146. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 15, 30; infra Table 2.
147. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 2. "Ultimately 122 blacks were indicted by
the grand jury on charges growing out of the riot, seventy-three charged with mur-

der. No whites were indicted." Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). See also infra text accompanying note 230.
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Table 2
The Elaine Riot Capital Cases

W

F

Convicted

Victim

Ed Ware

Nov. 18

W.D. Adkins

4 minutes

Will Wordlow Nov. 4

W.D. Adkins

9 minutes

Albert-Giles

Nov. 4

James A. Tappan

Joe Fox

Nov. 4

James A.Tappan

6 minutes) Joint
) trial
6 minutes)

John Martin

Nov. 4

W.D. Adkins

Alf Banks, Jr. Nov. 4

W.D. Adkins

N/A) Joint
) trial
N/A )

Frank Hicks

Nov. 2

Clinton Lee

8 minutes

Frank Moore
Ed Hicks

Nov. 2
Nov. 2

Clinton Lee
Clinton Lee

7 minutes
7 minutes

}
} Joint

J.E. Knox
Paul Hall

Nov. 2
Nov. 2

Clinton Lee
Clinton Lee

7 minutes
7 minutes

} trial
}

Ed Coleman

Nov. 2

Clinton Lee

7 minutes

}

S.
M

Jury Deliberations

Defendant

0

0
R
E
D
E
F

14 8

S.

148. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 16-18, 86; cf infra text accompanying note
200 (allegation in petition of last set of defendants that jury was out two or three
minutes); Martineau Record, supra note 140, at 14 (same allegation in petition of
Frank Hicks).
At a subsequent point in the proceedings, see infra text accompanying note
155, the cases were grouped into two sets, Ware and Moore, as indicated in the left
margin of the table.
With respect to the Moore set, it was the theory of the prosecution that Frank
Hicks (the brother of Ed Hicks) had fired the shots that killed Lee; the remaining
defendants were charged as aiders and abetters. The transcript of the trial of Frank
Hicks is to be found in the Martineau Record, supra note 140, in Exhibit D, at 5-26.
See infra note 150 (describing Exhibit D). The transcript of the trial of the other
Moore defendants is to be found in the Transcript of Record at 27-54, Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (No. 199) (filed October 24, 1921) [hereinafter cited as
Dempsey Transcript]. See generally Brief for the Appellants at 23, Moore v; Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (No. 199) (filed Jan. 8, 1923) (describing brevity of this trial).
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The remaining 67 sentences resulted from guilty pleas entered,
perhaps prudently, after these trials had taken place.'
In December, all the defendants filed a motion for a new
trial. 5 ' The primary grounds were:
1.

[They are all] negro[es] of the African race, and.., at the

time of the returning of... [the] indictment and trial ... bitterness of feeling among the whites of... [the] county, against the
negroes, especially against the defendant[s] was ... at the height
of intensity ... [and] co-extensive with the county; ... [t]hat
during ... [their] confinement... [they] were frequently subjected to torture, for the purpose of extracting from ...
[them] ad-

mission[s] of guilt-as were others then also in custody, to force
them to testify against defendant[s]; ... [t]hat while ... [they
were] ...
confined, several hundred white men of said county,

assembled at or near the court house and jail, for the purpose of
mobbing... [them], and were only prevented from doing so ...
by the presence of United States soldiers ... ; [t]hat the indictment was returned ...

by... [a] grand jury composed wholly of

white men;... [t]hat... without ever having been permitte[d] to
see or talk with an attorney, or any other person, in reference

149. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 18.
150. See id. at 84. The text of this document is preserved, insofar as it relates to
the Moore defendants other than Frank Hicks, see infra note 189, in the Transcript
of Record at 35-40, Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630 (1920) (No. 955) (filed May 24,
1920), which is to be found in the Washington facility of the National Archives and
Record Administration, Records Group 267, U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Case File
No. 27710, Box 6593. This certiorari proceeding was re-designated No. 360 when
carried over from the October, 1919 to the October, 1920 Term, when the writ was
denied, see Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630 (1920); infra note 160 and accompanying text.
CORTNER, supra note 131, at 84 states that this motion was filed on December
18, 1919. Actually, it appears to have been signed by defendants on that date, and
filed on December 20, 1919. See Transcript of Record at 38, Moore (No. 955).
Although previous scholars seem to have been unaware of the fact, the simultaneous new trial motion filed on behalf of Frank Hicks has also been preserved. It
is in the Transcript of Record at 55-64, Hicks v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630 (1920) (No.
956), which is to be found in the Washington facility of the National Archives and
Record Administration, Records Group 267, U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Case File
No. 27711, Box 6593. This certiorari proceeding was re-designated No. 361 when
carried over from the October, 1919 to the October, 1920 Term, when the writ was
denied, see Hicks v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630 (1920); infra note 160 and accompanying text. Frank Hicks' new trial motion is also to be found in the Martineau Record,
supra note 140, at 31-37. The transcript of his trial is reproduced in the Martineau
Record, supra, as 5-26 of Exhibit D.
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to... [their] defense,... [they were] carried from the jail to the

Court room and put on trial-the court appointing an attorney for
them-before a jury composed wholly of white men;... [t]hat the
excitement and feeling against the defendant[s] among the whites
of said county was such that it was impossible to obtain any unprejudiced jury of white men to try... [them]-and that no white
jury,... [even if] fairly disposed, would have had the courage to
acquit... [them];.. ; [t]hat the trial proceeded without consultation on... [their] part with any attorney, without any witnesses
in... [their] behalf and without an opportunity on... [their]
part to obtain witnesses or prepare for defense;... [t]hat no
evidence was offered in... [their] behalf; ...

[t]hat the jury...

returned... within about three to six minutes, with a verdict of
guilty against the defendant[s].... Defendant[s], therefore, say[]
that... [they were] convicted and sentenced to death without
due process of law.
2. [N]o negro has been appointed a jury commissioner, or
selected to serve as a juror, either grand or petit, for more than
thirty years; ...

that they are excluded therefrom solely on ac-

count of their race and color;.., that the defendants have thus
been.., deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the
United States, and especially the 14th Amendment... [and are]
denied the equal protection of the law. Defendant[s] further say[]
that while it is true, as ... [they are] now advised, that the prop-

er... time to have objected.., would have been before trial;
yet... [they] knew nothing of... [their] right[] to raise any
objection[] ...

and... [were] not advised in that regard.., and

that... [they], therefore, feel that... [their] objection, taken at
this time should prevail to the extent of securing them a new
trial. 151
Annexed as exhibits were two affidavits, both from prisoners
under death sentences as a result of the Ware trials. One, from
Alf Banks, Jr., stated that while confined prior to trial:
I was frequently whipped with great severity, and was also
put into an electric chair and shocked, and strangling drugs
would be put to my nose to make me tell things against others... [They] tortured me so that I finally told them falsely that
what they wanted me to say was true and that I would testify to
it.... As they were taking me to the Courtroom, they told me if I
changed my testimony or did not testify as I had said, when they
151. Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 55-59.
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took me back, they would skin me alive. I testified as I had told
them... It was not true; it was false.... I would never have
testified falsely as I did if I had not been made to [d]o it.'52
The other, from William Wordlow, stated:
[In jail,] I was not permitted to... do anything towards
preparing any defense. While in custody there, I was frequently
taken from the cell, blindfolded, whipped and tortured to make
me tell things I did not know, and furnish false information, and
testify against others of the negroes ....
To escape from the torture, I finally said what they wanted me to say .... All that I
said against [defendants] ...
was forced. I do not know of any
negro who killed or advised or encouraged the killing of either
Mr. Adkins, Mr. Lee, Mr. Tappan or anyone else, and would not
have voluntarily testified that I did. As I was taken to the courtroom, I was given to understand that if I did not testify as they
had directed, I would be killed. 5 '
The motion was summarily denied the day it was argued,"
and all the defendants appealed from its denial as part of their
direct appeals.
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court divided the cases
into two groups, as shown in Table 2 above. In one opinion, it
reversed the convictions of the Ware defendants and remanded
for new trials because the juries had simply rendered general
guilty verdicts, failing to abide by a state statute requiring them
to "find by their verdict whether [the defendant] be guilty of
murder in the first or second degree."1 55

152. Id. at 61-62.
153. Id. at 63-64.
154. See id. at 67-68.
155. See Banks v. State, 219 S.W. 1015, 1016 (Ark. 1920) (quoting Kirby's Digest
§ 2409). According to CORTNER, supra note 131, at 86, this issue was raised for the
first time on oral argument of the appeal.
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With respect to the Moore defendants, the court, in another
opinion,156 first ruled that the allegations of racial discrimination in jury selection had come too late. 5 7 It then continued:
It is now insisted that, because of the incidents developed at
the trial and those recited in the motion for new trials, and the
excitement and feeling growing out of them, no fair trial was had,
or could have been had, and that the trial did not, therefore,
constitute due process of law.
It is admitted, however, that eminent counsel was appointed
to defend appellants, and no attempt is made to show that a fair
and impartial trial was not had, except as an inference from the
facts stated above; the insistence being that a fair trial was impossible under the circumstances stated.
We are unable, however, to say that this must necessarily
have been the case. The trials were had according to law, the jury
was correctly charged.., and the testimony is legally sufficient
to support the verdicts returned. We cannot, therefore, in the face
of this affirmative showing, assume that the trial was an empty
ceremony, conducted for the purpose only of appearing to comply
with the requirements of the law, when they were not in fact
being complied with....
We have given these cases the careful consideration which
their importance required, but our consideration is necessarily
limited to those matters which are properly brought before us for
review, and.., the judgments must be affirmed.'58

156. Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308 (Ark. 1920).
The factual recitations of this opinion, Hicks, 220 S.W. at 309, are inconsistent
with the trial record in several respects; the statement that armed pickets guarding
the defendants' meeting the night before the Lee shooting fired into a car parked
outside "and killed one of the men in it," id., has no support in the trial testimony,
and the statement that Moore had said "that some of their members were being attacked, and that they would go and help them fight," id., significantly overstates the
trial testimony, "especially in changing Moore's alleged statement from a declaration
of what 'he' intended to do to a statement of what 'they' intended to do," Brief for
the Appellants, supra note 148, at 28. See infra note 219.
157. See Hicks, 220 S.W. at 309.
158. Id. at 309-10.
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Purely for exhaustion purposes, but expecting that the real contest would come on federal habeas corpus,'59 counsel filed petitions for certiorari. 16°
Meanwhile, the retrials of the Ware cases got underway;
this time, they were litigated far more aggressively than before.
Counsel filed motions seeking:
(a) to remove "the cases to the U.S. district court on the
ground that there had been no blacks summoned to serve on
either the grand or trial juries and the defendants could not
receive the equal protection of the laws in the state court." 6 '
(b) a change of venue. "Apparently because of fear of retaliation, [counsel] could get only four local blacks to testify in support of the motion for a change of venue," which was denied
after a hearing lasting an hour and a half.'62
(c) to quash the indictments and the venire because, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, no blacks had been included. These motions were also denied."

159. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 89-90 (quoting letter from counsel explaining that although "[we] are not very hopeful of any favorable result on this petition
in the Supreme Court of the United States, yet we thought it wise, if not absolutely
necessary, to take this course with these cases, in order to exhaust all direct remedies which are, or may be, afforded by law, before applying in the District Court of
the United States . . . for writs of habeas corpus").
Counsel were acting prudently in the face of legal uncertainty. Not until Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-36 (1963), could counsel in a capital case have felt genuinely secure in omitting the filing of such a petition entirely.
160. These are the petitions, discussed supra note 150, that were denied as
Moore v. Arkansas, 254 U.S. 630 (1920) (No. 360) and Hicks v. Arkansas, 254 U.S.
630 (1920) (No. 361). In neither case did the state bother to file opposition papers.
161. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 91. This motion was made under the Act of
Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 31, 36 Stat. 1096, an ancestor of the current 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443 (1994), which provided,
When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any State
court . . . against any person who is denied or can not enforce in the judicial
tribunals of the State . . . any law providing for the equal civil rights of
citizens of the United States . . . such suit or prosecution may [be removed]
upon the petition of such defendant.
However, the Supreme Court had long construed the statute as not applying to
cases "in which a right is denied by judicial action during the trial," Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880). In such cases, petitioners had to assert their federal
claims in the state system, subject to ultimate Supreme Court review. See Neal, 103
U.S. at 387.
162. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 91-92.
163. See Ware v. State, 225 S.W. 626, 627-28 (Ark. 1920).
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In three separate trials, all six Ware defendants were convicted once more, notwithstanding the testimony of two of them
that they had previously been tortured.'64
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court again reversed and
remanded for a new trial."s In an opinion issued on December
6, 1920, it held:
(a) that the denial of the removal petition had been proper
since no state law prevented blacks from enforcing their civil
rights;16
(b) over one dissent, that the "lower court did not abuse its
discretion" in rejecting the motion for a change of venue after
hearing the testimony of the witnesses;'6 7
(c) but that, under controlling federal authority, the defendants had been entitled to present evidence in support of their
claims of racial discrimination in jury selection.'"
Meanwhile, on October 11, the United States Supreme
Court had denied the certiorari petition of the Moore defendants169 -whose identical claim had been rejected because it
was made too late. 70
This action led to various lobbying efforts aimed at persuading the Governor to grant or deny clemency.' 7' Among these
was a resolution from the local American Legion Post opposing
clemency on the ground that "when the guilty negroes were
apprehended, a solemn promise was given by the leading citizens of the community, that if these guilty parties were not
lynched, and let the law take its course, that justice would be
done and the majesty of the law upheld."'72 Supporting this position, five of the members of the Committee of Seven wrote the
Governor:

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
respect
632.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 92.
See Ware, 225 S.W. at 632.
See id. at 628.
See id at 628.
See id at 629-31. Two of the Justices dissented from this last holding with
to one of the defendants, who had not made a specific objection. See id. at
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 157.
See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 97-99.
Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 77.
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With all the provocation our people refrained from mob violence.
The reason they did this was that this Committee gave our citizens their solemn promise that the law would be carried out. This
Community can be made a model one so far as resorting to mob
violence is concerned, but should the Governor commute any
sentence of these Elaine rioters, this would be difficult, if not
impossible. 7 '
On November 15, the Governor announced that he had
decided to deny clemency, in recognition of the fact that the
community had "refrained from mob violence" on the basis of
"the definite promise to the people of Phillips County [by the
Committee of Seven] that the law would be enforced and that
there would be no outside influence permitted to interfere .... 174
Eventually, an execution date was set for June 10, 1921.'
Suddenly, a potentially fatal roadblock appeared in the path to
obtaining federal habeas relief: The district judge was out of
town until after the scheduled execution date, and "apparently
no substitute was available." 7 ' On June 8, counsel "in desperation ... filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the Pulaski
County Chancery Court," consisting essentially177 of the petitions
they had been planning to file in federal court.

173. Id. at 71.
174. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 99-100 (quoting the ARKANSAS GAZErTE, Nov.
16, 1920, at 1).
175. See id. at 105. Meanwhile, in May, the Ware defendants had again moved
for a change of venue. In reliance upon the affidavits of several black residents of
the county, the same trial judge this time granted the motion, setting the retrial in
another county for October. See id. at 108.
176. Id. at 115.
177. Id. at 115-16. The federal court petitions are described infra text accompanying notes 189-210.
The text of the state petition filed on behalf of Frank Hicks is to be found in
the Martineau Record, supra note 140, at 6-24. Cf. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 217
n.35 (relying on text published in newspaper, probably petitions of other defendants).
Frank Hicks' petition, which was "exactly alike as to form and substance" as the one
filed on behalf of the other petitioners, Petition for Certiorari at 2, M2artineau v.
Arkansas, 257 U.S. 665 (1921) (No. 525) (filed Sept. 10, 1921), annexed two new
affidavits.
In one, sworn to on May 18, 1921, George Green stated that he had testified
against Frank Hicks, but
I now state and swear positively, that the testimony was false from beginning
to end, and that I testified as I did because I was compelled to do so. . . . I
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The chancellor, John E. Martineau, stayed the executions
and ordered the warden to produce the prisoners before him on
June 10."7 The Attorney General on June 9 filed an application for a writ of prohibition with the Arkansas Supreme Court,
which, over the objections of the Chief Justice,17 set the matter down for argument on June 13, leaving the stay in place." °

was not whipped, but a great many of the negroes there in jail with me were
whipped.... [Iln order to avoid such punishment I finally agreed to testify to
anything that they wanted me to say .... At the same time I was indicted
for the murder of Clinton Lee, and they told me that if I would testify
against Frank Hicks and then plead guilty, that they would get the court to
make it light on me. I later pled guilty to murder in the second degree and
was sentenced to six years in the penitentiary ....
I was not guilty of having
anything to do with the killing of Clinton Lee or anybody else....
Martineau Record, supra note 140, at 33-35.
The second affidavit, also sworn to on May 18, 1921, was from John Jefferson.
He stated that he had testified in both Moore trials, but had done so falsely because
of threats of whipping and execution, and eventually, despite his innocence, pleaded
guilty to the second degree murder of Clinton Lee (receiving a five-year sentence) "to
save my own life." Id. at 36-38.
In a third affidavit of the same date, Walter Ward, arrested for the killing of
Clinton Lee, stated that he had been whipped until "they nearly killed me. I was
also put in an electric chair, stripped naked and the current turned on to shock and
frighten me. They also put up my nose some kind of strangling drugs to further
torture and frighten me." As a result, he testified falsely "in the case against Frank
Moore and others," and, having been "told that if I did not plead guilty I would be
sent to the electric chair and in order to save myself further torture and to save my
life I plead guilty to murder in the second degree, and was sentenced to 21 years in
the penitentiary. I was not guilty." Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 15-16.
Although not attached to Frank Hicks' Chancery Court petition, inasmuch as
defense counsel had this affidavit in hand and later filed it in federal court, it was
presumably annexed to the Chancery Court petition of the other defendants.
One effect of the state filings was to generate "the most extensive publicity
the contentions of the NAACP and the defense counsel had yet received in the white
press of Arkansas" and an editorial representing "the first dissenting voice among
the ranks of the state's white press on the handling of the Phillips County riot."
CORTNER, supra note 131, at 116-17.
178. See State v. Martineau, 232 S.W. 609, 610 (Ark. 1921); Martineau Record,
supra note 140, at 53-56 (copies of orders).
179. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 116.
180. See Martineau, 232 S.W. at 610. According to CORTNER, supra note 131, at
118 (which gives the date of this argument as June 12), when counsel
argued on behalf of the condemned men that the state's evidence in the original trials had been secured through torture, in violation of due process, Chief
Justice McCulloch stopped him in mid-argument. Such contentions, he said,
were irrelevant to the issue of the chancery court's jurisdiction to issue the
writs and the injunction.
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On June 20, the court issued a unanimous opinion granting
prohibition. It held that under state law the chancellor clearly
lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding and continued with a
discussion of counsel's contention "that the provision of the Constitution with reference to due process of law and the federal
statutes prescribing the remedies whereby the constitutional
guaranty may be enforced must be read into the state laws so
that the prescribed remedies may be afforded in the state
courts."'8 1 The court rejected the argument that Frank supported this conclusion and held that the federal habeas corpus statute applied only to the federal courts, while the due process
clause did not reach the arrangements that a state chose to
make for the distribution of judicial business within its own
court system.'8 2
Since Circuit Justice Van Devanter was unavailable at his
vacation home in Canada, counsel were given a choice of Justices in Washington to whom to present an application for a writ of
error." Unsurprisingly, they picked Justice Holmes, who denied the application on August 4.1'

181. Martineau, 232 S.W. at 612.
182. See id. at 613. While commenting "[wihat the result would be of an application to a federal court under the statute referred to and upon the facts stated in the
petition we need not inquire," id., the court strongly hinted that such an application
would be meritless under Frank. Contrary to Justice Holmes' later suggestion, see
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923), the passage certainly does not appear to
be meant as encouragement for the prisoners to pursue federal relief.
183. See Letter from H.C. McKenney, Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of the United
States, to Murphy, McHaney & Dunway, Counsel for Petitioners, (July 15, 1921).
This document is to be found among the correspondence described infra note 185.
184. See Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 9. It is a plausible speculation
that Holmes considered himself in the same procedural position as he had been in
ruling on Frank's similar application, see supra text accompanying note 75. Whatever
might be thought about the petitioners' constitutional allegations, the decision below
was fully supportable on the independent state ground that the Chancellor had no
jurisdiction.
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Counsel then followed up with a certiorari petition."s But,
quite apart from its dubious probabilities of success,"s this petition would not operate as a stay. 7 With a new execution

185. Petition for Certiorari, Martineau v. Arkansas, 257 U.S. 665 (1921) (No.
525). While, for the reasons described infra note 186, this document is not of great
legal significance, it has some importance as a historical source.
Located in the Washington facility of the National Archives and Records Administration, Records Group 267, U.S. Supreme Court Appellate Case File No.
28480, Box 6889, it is accompanied by the Martineau Record, supra note 140, which
contains a number of documents not otherwise accessible, and by related procedural
correspondence.
186. The petition alleged that the
Supreme Court of Arkansas erred . . . in holding as it did, either in express
terms, or by necessary implication(1) That the . . . Chancellor . . . had no jurisdiction to grant the relief
prayed for . . . under Section 1 of the 14th [Amendment].
(2) That the provision of the Constitution of the United States with
reference to "due process of law" has no application to the Courts of the State.
(3) [That] the Federal statutes prescribing the remedies whereby the
Constitutional guaranty of "due process of law" may be enforced cannot be
read [into the state laws so that the prescribed remedies may be afforded in
the State Courts.
(4) That the . . . Chancellor . . . had no jurisdiction, under the "due
process of law" clause of the 14th Amendment . . . and under the laws of
Congress enacted in pursuance thereto to inquire into the jurisdiction of the
Phillips Circuit Court [notwithstanding the claim] that said Phillips Circuit
Court lost its jurisdiction by virtue of mob domination . . . and that as a
result thereof [petitioners] were . . . about to be deprived of their lives without "due process of law."
(5) That the ...
Chancellor . . . in determining the question of the
jurisdiction of the Phillips Circuit Court . . was limited to the regularity of
the process on its face.
(6) In issuing the writ of Prohibition . . .
Petition for Certiorari at 4-5, Martineau (No. 525).
Particularly in light of the denial of the writ of error by Justice Holmes, see
supra note 184 and accompanying text, it seems quite safe to speculate that, had
this petition not been withdrawn, see infra note 188, it would have been denied,
since Rulings (1), (3), and (4) were not erroneous; Ruling (2) was not made below
and the attack on Ruling (6) added nothing to the petition. The Court could perhaps
have chosen to review Ruling (5) and hold it a due process violation for a state
court system to fail to provide an adequate system of inquiry into threats of mob
domination, but there seems little likelihood that it would have made a discretionary
decision to awaken the sleeping dogs of Frank at a moment when petitioners still
had the federal habeas corpus remedy available.
187. See Letter from E.L. McHaney, Counsel for Petitioner, to James D. Maher,
Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, (Sept. 7, 1921) (enclosing petition, and
requesting that state officers be notified of its filing "and that the contemplated
executions are by virtue of the filing of the petition, automatically stayed"); Letter
from William R. Stansbury, Acting Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of the United
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date set for September 23 and the Court in recess until October,
"[t]he lives of the condemned men were once again in peril.""
On September 21, 1921, counsel filed habeas corpus petitions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas.18 9 These petitions alleged that on September 30,
1919, while "petitioners and a large number of the members of
their race were peaceably and lawfully assembled in their
church house at or near Hoop Spur... white persons began firing guns... for the purpose of breaking up said meeting" and
that in the resulting melee W.A. Adkins, one of the raiders, "was
killed either by members of his own party or by some other
person unknown."9 ° News of the killing "spread like wild fire"

States, to Murphy, McHaney & Dunaway, Counsel for Petitioner, (Sept. 10, 1921)
(replying, "[a]s requested, I have notified the Governor, the Attorney General, and
the Keeper of the Penitentiary of the filing of this petition, but the filing of such a
petition does not automatically stay execution, and I have therefore not so stated in
my letters to the officers above named."). This correspondence is among that described supra note 185. The circumstances of Stansbury's appointment to his position
are described in Robert Post, Judicial Management and Judicial Disinterest: The
Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, 1998 J. S. CT. HIST.
50, 52-53.
188. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 125. The certiorari petition, having been
mooted by the federal habeas proceedings described infra text accompanying notes
189-210, was voluntarily dismissed by counsel in October. See Martineau v. Arkansas, 257 U.S. 665 (1921); Letter from E.L. McHaney, Counsel for Petitioner, to
James D. Maher, Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, (Sept. 27, 1921) (habeas proceedings "will supplant the Petition for Certiorari, and we will kindly ask
that you dismiss the Petition for Writ of Certiorari"). This letter is among the correspondence described supra note 185.
189. See United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Law
Docket Book, Book G, at 110-11 (now in the Federal Records Center, Fort Worth).
One petition (No. 6247) was filed on behalf of Frank Hicks and one (No. 6246) on
behalf of the other five defendants. When the cases reached the Supreme Court,
counsel stipulated that only the latter record need be printed, "and that the record
in the Frank Hicks case need not be printed. We further agree that these causes
may be consolidated and submitted together upon one printed record, as aforesaid,
and briefs in said cause." Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 106. At the time,
both cases bore Supreme Court case numbers for the October, 1921 Term, Hicks v.
Dempsey being No. 594, and Moore v. Dempsey, No. 595. Id. The former was subsequently assigned No. 198 in the October, 1922 Term, and the latter No. 199, see
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
The record of the Frank Hicks case, although not printed, remains in manuscript form in the Washington facility of the National Archives and Record Administration, where it constitutes United States Supreme Court Appellate Case File No.
28549 in Records Group 267.
190. Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 1-2.
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through the region, and early the next day numerous white men
formed themselves into posses and "began the indiscriminate
shooting down of Negroes, both men and women, particularly
the posse from the State of Mississippi, who shot down in cold
blood innocent Negro men and women, many of whom were at
the time in the fields picking cotton."'91 Clinton Lee, whom petitioners were convicted of killing, was one of these white men,
whose activities were supported by public officials and the press
as an effort to quell an "uprising of the Negroes'.

.

. or insur-

rection."'92

Finally, "a company of soldiers was dispatched to
the scene of the trouble who took charge of the situation and finally succeeded in stopping the slaughter."93
Having been charged with murder, the petition continued,
the petitioners were incarcerated "together with a large number
of their race, both men and women."" A "committee of seven... leading.., business men and officials.., was selected
for the purpose of probing into the situation."'95 This group examined those incarcerated, and if the prisoners failed to give
satisfactory evidence,
[T]hey would be sent out and certain of their keepers would
take them to a room in the jail w[h]ich was immediately adjoining, and a part of the Courthouse building where said Committee
was sitting, and torture them by beating and whipping them with
leather straps with metal in them, cutting the blood at every lick
until the victim would agree to testify to anything their torturers
demanded of them; ... [and] to further frighten and torture

them, [there was] an electric chair, in which they would be put
naked and the current turned on to shock and frighten them into
giving damaging statements against themselves and others; also
strangling drugs were put up their noses for the same purpose
and by these methods and means false evidence was extorted
from1 Negroes to be used and was used against your petitioners.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

9

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
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After the Committee had published its conclusion that the
tumult had not been a race riot, but rather "a 'deliberately
planned insurrection of the Negroes against the Whites,'" a mob
"of hundreds of men...
marched to the County jail for the purpose and with the intent of
lynching your petitioners... and would have done so but for the
interference of United States soldiers and the promise of some of
said Committee and other leading officials that if the mob would
stay its
hand they would execute those found guilty in the form of
19 7
law."

The petitioners then recounted how the attorney who had
been consulting with them on attacking the share cropping system had been incarcerated for a month and eventually, with the
assistance of the same judge who was to try them, spirited out of
town "so as to avoid being mobbed." 9 '
Resuming the main thread of the narrative, the petitioners
continued with the allegations "that a grand jury was organized
composed wholly of white men, one of whom ... was a member
of the said Committee ... and many of whom were in the posses"; that the grand jury heard false testimony--extracted by
torture-and indicted them for the murder of Clinton Lee, "a
man petitioners did not know, and had never, to their knowledge
even seen"; and that they were brought into the trial courtroom
on November 3, 1919
and were informed that a certain lawyer was appointed to defend
them ... [who] did not consult with them, took no steps to prepare for their defense, asked nothing about their witnesses,
though there were many who knew that petitioners had nothing
to do with the killing .... '9
After a "joint trial before an exclusively white jury," in which
only the state presented evidence-consisting of testimony that
"was wholly false" and had been extracted by torture, death
threats, and promises of leniency-"the jury retired just long

197. Id. at 3.
198. Id. at 4. See supra note 141. This story may have made a particular impression on Justice Holmes, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88 (1923), because the
lawyer involved was the son of one of the lawyers who argued the case in the Supreme Court, where he recounted the tale. See infra text accompanying note 230.
199. Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 4-5.
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enough to write a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree... not being out exceeding two or three minutes.... 2 0o
All during this trial and those of the other defendants,
large crowds of white people bent on petitioners' condemnation
and death thronged the courthouse and.., the attorney appointed to defend them knew that the prejudice against them was
such that they could not get a fair and impartial trial... yet he
filed no petition for a change of venue[;]... all, Judge, jury and
counsel were dominated by the mob spirit.., so that if any juror
had had the. courage to... vote for an acquittal, he, himself,
would have been the victim of the mob, as would have been the
fate of counsel if he had objected to the government's
testimony
201
on the grounds that it was extorted by torture.
The court "lost its jurisdiction by virtue of such mob domination," and although "carried through in the apparent form of
law,.., the verdict of the jury was really a mob verdict,...
returned because no other verdict would have been tolerated."2" Indeed, "the entire trial, verdict and judgment" were
simply the implementation of the prior extra-legal investigation
and conclusions of the Committee of Seven.0 3
After an attack on the all-white jury system, 2° the petitioners recounted the protests of the American Legion Post and
others 205 to "show that the only reason the mob stayed its
hand, the only reason they were not lynched was that the leading citizens of the community made a solemn promise to the
mob that they should be executed in the form of law"; they added that the setting of their execution date the previous June had
been to deter the mob from lynching the Ware defendants as
they came up for retrial in May2° and charged "that the mob

200. Id. at 5.
201. Id. at 5-6.
202. Id. at 6.
203. Id. at 6-7.
204. This was substantially the same as the one set forth supra text accompanying note 151, but in place of any explicit mention of the Federal Constitution was
the allegation that the failure of counsel to object "was through fear of the mob for
petitioners and himself." Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 7-8.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
206. See supra note 175; see also CORTNER, supra note 131, at 117 (describing
newspaper editorial discussing the argument that state officials should have ignored
the Chancellor's stay, described supra text accompanying note 178, and executed the

Alabama Law Review

1520

[Vol. 51:4:1467

spirit, mob
domination, is still universally present in Phillips
°7
2

County."

Thus, petitioners:
were deprived of their rights and are about to be deprived of their
lives in violation of Section 1, of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the United States
enacted in pursuance thereto, in that they have been denied the
equal protection of the law, and have been convicted, condemned,
and 20are
about to be deprived of their lives without due process of
8
law.

In a significant strengthening of the factual case that petitioners had previously presented,2 ° the petition annexed the
affidavits of two men who had been special agents of the Missouri-Pacific Railroad at the time of the riot, T.K. Jones and H.F.
Smiddy (later a local law enforcement officer), who was in the
automobile with Clinton Lee when he was killed. Both men had
assisted in the Committee in its investigation and they provided
detailed accounts of the whippings and other tortures they had
personally inflicted, as well as eyewitness corroboration for almost all of the petitioners' other major allegations-including
the allegation of actual innocence.21 °
In response to this petition, the State tersely demurred, on
the basis "that the said petition does not allege facts sufficient to
entitle the petitioner to the relief prayed for" and moved for
dismissal. 21 ' The district court, having heard oral argument,

Moore defendants in order to prevent the lynching of the Ware defendants).
207. Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 8-9.
208. Id. at 10.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53; supra note 177.
210. See Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 86-99; CORTNER, supra note 131,
at 121-25; Brief for the Appellants at 12-14, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)
(No. 199). Justice McReynolds later referred to these as "the affidavits of two white
men-low villains according to their own admissions," Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86, 93 (1923) (McReynolds & Sutherland, JJ., dissenting).
211. Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 101. In view of the significant consequences of the decision to adopt this course, see infra p. 1525; infra note 231; see
also CORTNER, supra note 131, at 131 ("Indeed, the attorney general's response to
the habeas corpus petition was a vital factor in the NAACFs ultimate victory in the
Moore litigation."), it seems worth pausing to wonder why it was made. Quite possibly, the simple answer is that there was no other viable choice. Apart from the
reality that any hearing, which would take place under the eyes of a well-informed
press, see supra note 177, would be at best highly embarrassing to the State, its
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granted the motion in an equally 212
terse order and issued a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
The bulk of appellants' brief to the United States Supreme
Court was devoted to a forceful discussion of the facts. Indeed,
even the relatively few pages headed "The Law" concluded:
If this Court on reading this petition, these affidavits and
this record is not satisfied that if there ever was a case in which
habeas corpus should be granted this is the case, no argument of
counsel will convince them, and we submit with confidence that
either habeas corpus should be granted in this case or habeas
corpus is not a practical remedy for such outrages as the evidence
in this case discloses.1 3
The strictly legal discussion consisted primarily of attempts to
distinguish Frank on various grounds:
(a) "[T]he thing which distinguishes this case from the
Frank case is that the Supreme Court of Arkansas did not pass
on the question whether the allegations in the motion for a new
trial... were true or not. The court assumed that they were
true, and said it did
not follow from them that the trial was
214
necessarily unfair."

(b) In Frank, those factual allegations of the petitioner
which were found by the Georgia Supreme Court to have been
supported by the facts-his absence from the verdict and "expressions of feeling by spectators during the trial... [which
were] promptly repressed by the court"--did not, "in the opinion
of the [U.S. Supreme Court] majority, show such mob control of
the court as denied the defendant due process of law."215 But
counsel surely had every reason to believe that an unbiased federal judge, see infra
note 242, would find the factual allegations of the petition to be true. Cf CORTNER,
supra, note 131, at 173-79 (detailing difficulties petitioners might actually have faced
at hearing). Hence, the State's only plausible strategy-and a reasonable one in view
of Frank-was to attempt to win on the law. For a more legal analysis, see J.S.
Waterman & E.E. Overton, supra note 108, at 311-13.
212. Dempsey Transcript, supra note 148, at 101, 104.
213. Brief for the Appellants at 38, Moore (No. 199).
214. Id. at 29. See id. at 38 ("The allegations of fact were never considered by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas as they were by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
the Frank case, but the opinions apparently assume that they were true. This distinction between the cases is vital.").

215. Id. at 36. Having read this passage, Louis Marshall commented in Letter
from Louis Marshall to Walter White (Mar. 19, 1923), NAACP Papers, Library of

Congress, Box I-C-69:
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the "[v]ery
far different ... facts in this case" do make that
216
showing.
(c) By statute, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court7 of Arkansas in criminal cases is limited to matters of
21
law.
In the case at bar, the question whether the circumstances surrounding the trial were such as to render impossible a righteous
verdict was primarily a question of fact. Hence the Supreme
Court could not, without exceeding its jurisdiction, reverse the
action of the circuit court in refusing a new trial.218

In Frank,the Court decided
that, in a situation like that now presented, a State cannot be
said to have deprived an accused person. .. due process of law if
it has provided an independent tribunal for the examination of
his complaint and this tribunal, sitting in an atmosphere free
from the alleged disturbing elements, has held the complaint unfounded.219

The facts disclosed [in Moore] are shocking, but not more so than those in the
Frank case. As a matter of fact in that case, as the record showed, the Presiding Judge stated that he did not believe that the guilt of Frank had been
shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and when he requested Frank and his
counsel to remain out of court when the jury rendered its verdict he gave as
the reason that . . . he could not answer for the life of either Frank or his
counsel ....
It thus appeared clearly that the Court abdicated its powers and
recognized that the mob was controlling the action of the court. The facts in
Moore v. Dempsey merely related to the attitude of the general public but did
not indicate that the Judge was terrorized, as was the fact in the Frank
case ....
[T]he distinction sought to be made between the two cases [by counsel] is scarcely justified by the record.
See also infra note 268 (quoting further extract from this letter).
216. Brief for the Appellants at 36, Moore (No. 199).
217. Id. at 39 (quoting the statute from CRAWFORD & MOSES DIGEST OF THE
STATUTES OF ARKANSAS § 3413).

218. Id.
219. Id. at 40. Two pages earlier, in the paragraph immediately preceding the
one quoted at supra text accompanying note 214, the brief had remarked, "[F]or the
court to say that it cannot assume that the accused necessarily did not have a fair
trial shows clearly that the Supreme Court of Arkansas was itself influenced by the
same feeling that influenced the leaders of society throughout the region where these
tragedies occurred." Id. at 38. Similarly, in recounting the factual misstatements discussed at supra note 156, the brief added that "the attitude of the court toward the
case may be inferred" from their inclusion in the opinion. Brief for Appellants at 28,
Moore (No. 199).
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But the Arkansas statutory scheme "has made no provision of

this kind...

," leaving

an applicant for a new trial "nothing but

the empty right to have the facts upon which his application is

based passed upon by the very judge whose conduct is complained of, and that, too, only at a time when the adverse influences,... must still be operative with all their force. "22

The state filed its brief simultaneously.

1

In addition to

setting out the Frank opinion practically verbatim, 2 this brief

argued that the issues being presented to the Court had been
before it previously on the unsuccessful application to Justice

Holmes for a writ of error,2" so that "[a]ppellants are merely
attempting to use a writ of habeas corpus to review alleged

errors of law of the State Courts,"224 contrary to Frank's holding that habeas corpus "cannot be employed as a substitute for

the writ of error.'

Petitioners would be entitled to habeas

corpus only if the record were to "show on its face that the trial
court was under the influence of mob domination.., to such an

extent that the effect thereof wrought a disillusion [sic] of the
court..... "226 In addition, several of the affidavits annexed to
the petition had never been before the state courts, and "[t]o
sustain appellants' application... [on] said affidavits, would
open an avenue for every person charged with a crime, to wait

until he had exhausted his remedies in the State Courts [and]
then open his masked batteries on the State Courts....

p227

220. Id. at 40.
221. Both documents bear clerk's file stamps of January 8, 1923. See also Abstract and Brief for Appellee at 1, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (No. 199)
("The appellee has not been favored with any abstract or brief on behalf of the appellants").
222. Id. at 73-90.
223. See supra text accompanying note 184.
224. Abstract and Brief for the Appellee, supra note 221, at 72-73.
225. Id. at 73 (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915)). As indicated
supra note 104, although Frank had been less than explicit in its treatment of the
point, there was good reason to doubt that the quoted passage was as helpful to the
state as its counsel probably believed when he arrived in Washington to argue the
case. See infra text accompanying note 229 (describing the Court's response to oral
argument of this issue). The Supreme Court's Moore opinion treated the question as
Frank had-by rejecting the argument in silence, simply reiterating the general
proposition that "mere mistakes of law in the course of a trial are not to be corrected" by habeas corpus. Moore, 261 U.S. at 91; see infra text accompanying note
238 (quoting remainder of this passage).
226. Abstract and Brief for the Appellee at 55, Moore (No. 199).
227. Id. at 91-92. See also supra text accompanying notes 209-10. This ground of
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Our knowledge of the oral argument has been greatly enhanced by the research of Professor Richard C. Cortner, who
uncovered two illuminating letters at the Wisconsin State Historical Society.2' The first, from an NAACP official to local
counsel, summarizing the report of another NAACP official who
was present, recounts:
[T]he worthy Attorney General of Arkansas, Mr. Utley, in his
nasal twang, set out ...

to argue the case before the Supreme

Court as though he were talking to a petit jury in Phillips County. He started off by telling the court that it could do nothing else
than throw out the cases because the attorneys for the appellants
had made an error in attempting to bring the cases to that tribunal on a Writ of Habeas Corpus instead of on a Writ of Error.
Mr. Justice Holmes sharply reprimanded Attorney General Utley
at that point asking him in amazement if the Attorney General
meant to say that since the members of the jury, the presiding
judge and every person involved in the original trial had figuratively and almost literally pistols pressed against their breasts
demanding conviction of the defendants, the court had no right to
enquire into whether or not the men had had a fair trial. All the
Attorney General could do was to hastily disclaim any such statement which he did in a very embarrassed manner.
The only comment of any of the justices which savored of
unfavorable opinion was that by Mr. Justice McReynolds from
Tennessee. He said that undoubtedly the men had not received a
fair trial but that he was not at all sure that the attorneys had
properly handled the case. The cases lie "on the laps of the gods",
but we here feel very optimistic as to the decision. I hope that we
shall not be disappointed." 9

complaint received no sympathy from any Justice in the ultimate decision, probably
on the theory, strongly implicit in the first paragraph of the dissent, that the timing
of the affidavits was-like their sources-simply another factor for the district court's
consideration in determining whether to set the matter down for a hearing, rather
than being a legal barrier to doing so. See generally infra text accompanying notes
240-42.
228. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 152-53. These documents survive today in
the form of typescripts made by a previous scholar, Arthur I. Waskow, of originals
that are now lost. Id. at 201. Newspaper accounts of the argument included Arkansas Riots Appeal Argued in Highest Court, WASH. POST., Jan. 10, 1923, at 17; Negroes Beg Lives of Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1923, at 12.
229. Letter from Walter F. White to Scipio A. Jones (Jan. 12, 1923) (on file with
the Waskow Collection, Wisconsin State Historical Society, M76-358, Box 1, § 6
("Ark-Trial")).

Habeas Milestones-Frank /Moore

2000]

1525

The second is from one of the counsel who argued the case
for petitioners to the author of the previous letter:
I feel very hopeful for a reversal. The indications which I observed from the Court's remarks, made me feel that they were
convinced of the equity of our plea. The only remark made during
the whole proceeding which could be construed as in any way
raising a question as to the possible outcome was made by Justice
[Mc]Reynolds. He said that it appeared to be a rotten deal and
that the only question was as to whether it was in their power to
give the relief prayed for. Justice Holmes inquired of the Assistant Attorney General from Arkansas in this manner, "You do not
contend that if the whole affair was a mere sham, that however
regular the proceedings may have been, this Court would be deprived of the right of going into the case and granting the relief?".
Just as [co-counsel] was concluding, Justice Holmes said to
him, "Your contention is that the whole procedure was one dominated by a mob and that the conditions surrounding the trial
[were] such as to render the whole trial a nullity, and that under
the decisions of this Court in such cases, we have the jurisdiction
and it is our duty to give relief?" Judge Taft said to the attorney
representing the State, during the argument, "Yes, but you demurred to the petition thereby admitting the allegations of the
bill."
From this you will see that the indications were that the
Court was not in sympathy with the claim of the State.
...

In the limited time [allowed for my argument] I endeav-

ored to get a mental picture in the minds of the Court as to the
exact conditions in Arkansas. I told the Court that conditions had
grown up there that were worse than before the Civil war; that I
spoke from my knowledge gained during my 12 years experience
as a legal representative of the Department of Justice. I then
gave them an insight as to the brutality administered to the prisoners and then wound up with the treatment that was accorded
my son, and the conduct of the Judge in getting him away from
Helena; all showing that the conditions were such that it was
preposterous to have imagined a fair trial was had.
I referred to the fact that wholesale murders on the part of
the whites were committed by the killing of some 200 innocent
negroes, and that not a single indictment had been returned; that
if the influence of those in control of the Court was such as to
prevent an indictment, the same influence was sufficient to indict
and condemn the negroes that they had marked for execution.
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[Co-counsel] told the Court that if the record did not warrant
the relief demanded, that that part of the Constitution should be
eliminated as it would mean nothing. [He] feels, as I do, very sanguine of success.2 °
After argument, Holmes circulated a draft opinion that is
substantially similar to the one that was eventually published,
having drawn minimal editorial comment from those prepared to
join it. 1
Justice Van Devanter, who was home ill,23 2 wrote to Chief
Justice Taft,
I sent the opinion in the Arkansas habeas corpus case to Justice
McReynolds. I could not well read the changes suggested, but
they were read to me, and I rather doubt that there is enough in
them to have any particular trouble about them. As you say, the
opinion has been framed on a line which makes it almost impossible to write anything in that is worth while; and the more I think
about it the more I am disposed to believe that the opinion will
not constitute an unhappy precedent." s
Except for Brandeis, 23 4 no majority Justice ever suggested,

230. Letter from U.S. Bratton to Walter F. White (Jan. 11, 1923), Waskow Collection, supra note 229.
231. Taft wrote back, simply, "I like this opinion much," a comment preserved in
the copy of the opinion contained in Holmes' bound volumes in the Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76. But, in a note also preserved in the Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, Brandeis, consistent with Taft's comment at oral argument, see supra text accompanying note 230, changed Holmes' reference in the penultimate sentence from "facts that seem incontrovertible" to the published, "facts
admitted by the demurrer." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923).
232. The source for this statement is a personal letter from Justice Van Devanter
to Chief Justice Taft dated February 13, 1923, and found in the William Howard
Taft Papers, supra note 130 (Reel 250). It is a separate document from the one
bearing the same date that is quoted in the text and cited infra note 233.
233. Letter from Willis Van Devanter to William Howard Taft (Feb. 13, 1923),
William Howard Taft Papers, supra note 130 (Reel 250).
234. See infra text accompanying note 270. In a letter on the day the case was
decided, Brandeis commented to Frankfurter, in toto: "Holmes' Arkansas Case today
is a satisfaction." Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 19,
1923), reprinted in HALF BROTHER, HALF SON: THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 136 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991). The
editors identify the "Arkansas Case" as Moore, id. at n.2, altering their earlier view,
expressed in 3 LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 127, at 88 n.2, that the
reference was to St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
Since the date of the letter matches that of Moore, and is two and a half months
later than that of St. Louis Cotton Compress, the change seems entirely sound.
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either on or off the bench, so far as I am aware, that Moore
represented an alteration in the law of habeas corpus. 5 In
particular, Holmes, the central figure in this drama who had
freely expressed his distress over Frank,"5 said virtually nothing about Moore in his correspondence, even while discussing
other cases decided at the same time. 37

The editors had previously believed that a reference to "the Frank tragedy" in
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (June 3, 1924), reprinted in 3
LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 127, at 131, was to the Leo Frank case,
see id. at n.6, but they now believe it to have been to Bobby Franks, the victim in
the notorious murder case against Leopold and Loeb, see HALF BROTHER, HALF SON,
supra, at 170 n.4; see also CLARENCE DARROw, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 226-43 (1932)
(description of case by defense counsel); GILBERT GEIS & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES
OF THE CENTURY 13-47 (1998) (summarizing case); MICHAEL S. LIEF ET AL., LADIES
AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY 159-209 (1998) (summary of case followed by text of
Darrow's closing argument); see generally Eric Pace, Elmer Gertz, a Top Lawyer, Is
Dead at 93; Won for Leopold, Ruby and Henry Miller, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at
C20 (describing prison death of Loeb in 1936 and release of Leopold in 1958). This
latter view is far more convincing, both chronologically-as the letter was written at
a time when the Leopold and Loeb case was active but nine years after Leo Frank
was lynched-and substantively. Brandeis' comment is: "In the Frank tragedy it is,
at least, a mercy that the victim was a Jew," HALF BROTHER, HALF SON, supra, at
170, which does not fit the facts of Frank.
235. In contrast, Justice Clarke, author of the far more obscure case of Collins v.
McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922) (unanimous), explained at length to Chief Justice
Taft that writing an opinion to sustain the lower court's summary dismissal of a
writ "gave me a great deal of trouble" because "lower courts treat such applications
so very cavalierly now," Letter from John Clarke to William Howard Taft [undated,
but March or April, 1922], William Howard Taft Papers, supra note 130 (Reel 249).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 113-15. For whatever relevance it may
have, Holmes appears to have been generally stronger than at the time of Frank.
See Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 3, 1923), reprinted in
HALF BROTHER, HALF SON, supra note 234, at 132 ("Holmes J. felt so perky yesterday that he insisted on getting out of the carriage yesterday to walk with me from
12th & H home. And he said today that he felt better for the walk."); Letter from
Louis D. Brandeis to Alice Goldmark Brandeis (Feb. 4, 1923), reprinted in 3 LETTERS
OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 127, at 87 ("Holmes J.... has finished for the
printer his introduction to John Wigmore's book & read it to me. It is really
good . . . and he seems in good form.").
237. Prior to the publication of the case, Holmes mentioned it in Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Mrs. John C. (Nina L.) Gray (Jan. 20, 1923), Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76 ("[J]ust now I have a case on burning
themes, at which the boys have had their whack at the conference and which I
must tinker to get by those who are shy and are inclined to kick. I think I can
keep nearly all if not perhaps get all but it will need a little diplomatic adjustment."), and in Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Jan. 25,
1923), reprinted in HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 113, at 110 (reporting that
a case on "burning themes may go over for one of the JJ. or two, to consider wheth-
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In any event, the published Moore opinion, representing the
views of six Justices, consists principally of a summary of the
allegations of the petition and a statement of the procedural
history. Virtually the whole of its legal analysis is this:
In Frank v. Mangum ...

it was recognized of course that if

in fact a trial is dominated by a mob so that there is an actual
interference with the course of justice, there is a departure from
due process of law ....

We assume in accordance with that case

that the corrective process supplied by the State may be so adequate that interference by habeas corpus ought not to be allowed.
It certainly is true that mere mistakes of law in the course of a
trial are not to be corrected in that way. But if the case is that
the whole proceeding is a mask-that counsel, jury and judge
were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility
that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an
immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights....

er it shall be swallowed according to the majority or whether, as a child put it, they
will swallow up.").
After the opinion was published, Holmes seems not to have alluded to it in
his correspondence, although he did discuss various other contemporary cases. See,
e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 14, 1923), reprinted in HOLMES & FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 154 (Robert
M. Mennel & Christine M. Compston eds., 1996) ("I have just sent round an opinion
in a Porto Rico case [Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102 (1923)] that gives me a mild
titillation."); Letter from Alice Stopford Green to Oliver Wendell Holmes (May 6,
1923), Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers, supra note 76 (thanking Holmes for sending her his dissent in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
Indeed, he did not mention it even when a correspondent gave him an opening by asking for his views on a habeas corpus issue. Compare Letter from Harold
J. Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Feb. 11, 1923), reprinted in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS 482, 483 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (describing case raising the question of whether habeas corpus follows British flag), with Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 1, 1923), reprinted in id. at 485 (replying, "I can
say nothing profitable on the habeas corpus question.").
An academic could speculate that Holmes may have believed that there was
nothing especially remarkable about Moore's treatment of Frank because Holmes
entertained a general view that in writing opinions, "even if a judge thinks she is
laying down a clear rule to govern future cases, it can really be no better than a
prediction that future judges will follow that rule rather than distinguish it away or
overturn it," David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay
on Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1579 (1997).
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We shall not say more concerning the corrective process
afforded to the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make
the trial absolutely void.'
The dissent, written by Justice McReynolds and joined by
Justice Sutherland, said that the "right and wholesome" doctrine
of Frank, reached "after great consideration," should be applied
rather than being put aside in favor of "the views expressed by
the minority of the Court in that cause."" 9 On reviewing the
record-including the low character of the afflants relied upon,
the two prior applications to the Court, 4 the fact that the
American Legion and other protests to the Governor came a year
after trial, and the actions of the Arkansas Supreme Court in
twice reversing the convictions of the Ware defendants - the
dissent found itself "unable to say that the District Judge, acquainted with local conditions,2 4' erred when he held the petition for the writ of habeas corpus insufficient. His duty was to
consider the whole case and decide whether there appeared to be
substantial reason for further proceedings." 2
After the decision, which "produced relatively few editorial
comments in the national press,"24 3 the momentum behind the
Elaine riot cases began to dissipate. The Ware defendants were
released after a court ruling that the prosecution had delayed
too long in bringing them to trial.' In light of this development and with neither side eager to actually push the federal
habeas proceedings to a hearing,2 45 much less to undergo a

238. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-92 (1923).
239. Moore, 261 U.S. at 93 (McReynolds & Sutherland, JJ., dissenting).
240. I.e., the writ of error application to Justice Holmes, see supra text accompanying note 184, and the petition for certiorari described supra notes 185-87 and
accompanying text.
241. This statement was factually incorrect. The regular district judge, a former
resident of Phillips County, had recused himself on that basis, and the petition had
in fact been ruled on by a District Judge from Oklahoma City. See CORTNER, supra
note 131, at 131.
242. Moore, 261 U.S. at 101 (McReynolds & Sutherland, JJ., dissenting).
243. CORTNER, supra note 131, at 159.
244. See Ware v. State, 252 S.W. 934, 940 (1923); CORTNER, supra note 131, at
160-65.

245. On March 1, 1924, an order was entered dismissing the action for want of
prosecution. See Waterman & Overton, supra note 138, at 122; see also Letter from
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possible retrial of the underlying charges, a series of negotiated
arrangements led to a gubernatorial order commuting the sentences of the Moore defendants to twelve years imprisonment
and then to another, in January 1925, releasing them. 6
V. THE LEGAL EXPLANATION

Legal scholars have long differed irreconcilably in their
explanations of the disparate outcomes of Frank and Moore in
the Supreme Court of the United States. There are three leading
theories.
Paul M. Bator argues that the Moore "case is entirely con24 The argument is that Frank lost besistent with Frank."
cause "the prisoner's allegations were considered by the Georgia
Supreme Court under conditions which were concededly free
from any suggestion of mob domination and found by that court,
on independent inquiry, to be groundless,"2 48 while "in Moore,
unlike in Frank, the state supreme court did not conduct any
proceeding or make any inquiry into the truth of the allegations
of mob domination, and made no findings with respect to
them."249 Thus, Frank presented a situation in which the state
courts had delivered "reasoned findings rationally reached
through fair procedures," resulting in "a reasoned probability
that justice was done," while in Moore there was "a conclusory
and out-of-hand rejection by a state of a claim of violation of
federal right, without any process of inquiry being afforded at
all, [which] cannot insulate the merits of the question from the
habeas corpus court."' °
To Bator, then, the cases spoke to the scope of federal habeas corpus review"' and were consistent.
Charles F. Cole, Clerk, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to Helen Newman, Librarian, Supreme Court of the United States, (Oct. 26,
1962) (William 0. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 601, Moore v. Dempsey
Folder).
246. See CORTNER, supra note 131, at 166-83. Of the 67 non-capital prisoners, all
but eight had been freed by the summer of 1923, see id. at 166, and those eight
were released by the Governor in December, 1924, see id. at 182.
247. Bator, supra note 9, at 489.
248. Id. at 485.
249. Id. at 488-89.
250. Id. at 487, 489.
251. Id. at 486 n.119 ("Mr. Justice Pitney makes clear that his entire reasoning
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To Gary Peller, in contrast, the two cases dealt with the
substantive requirements of due process. In Frank, "[b]y allowing a procedurally adequate state appellate hearing to satisfy
due process requirements, the Court reduced the constitutional
claims available to a state prisoner on direct Supreme Court, or
habeas, review. " 1 2 In Moore, "the due process doctrine of

Frank was overturned," and the Court held that "regardless of
the nature of the state's appellate review," an allegation of a
mob-dominated trial stated a claim under the due process
clause.' Thus, the "dispositive difference between Frank and
Moore was the Court's view of the requirements of the due process clause," with Moore returning "due process law to its preFrank state."'
Criticizing both of these views, Professor James S. Liebman
finds that from "Frank to Moore, it was not habeas corpus or
due process that changed, but rather federal question appellate
review.""5 In Frank, the question of mob domination was
treated as one of fact and therefore not to be reviewed in a federal appellate court, on direct appeal or habeas corpus, whereas
in Moore the majority accepted the view that Justice Holmes
had articulated in his Frank dissent and characterized the issue
as a "mixed question"; then, applying in the criminal context a
doctrine of appellate review it had already articulated in the
realm of economic liberties, it granted de novo review." 6
While each of these views captures important thoughts
connected to the cases, none of them is fully explanatory. Bator's
view fails to come to grips with the fact that, even in Frank, it
was agreed on all hands that, regardless of the state processes,
is in the context of habeas corpus, which he carefully differentiates from ordinary
appeal. . . .Certainly any holding that on direct review the Supreme Court does not
have plenary jurisdiction ... would have been a startling reversal of the law established by Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)"). See supra
note 9 (observing that Bator's theory appears to have the support of three current
Justices).
252. Peller, supra note 8,at 646.
253. Id. at 646-47.
254. Id. at 648.
255. James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2081 (1992).
256. See id. at 2079-80; see also LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 7, at 64-65. Cf
supra note 113 (recording Holmes' concern at time of Frank that the Court was
wrongly valuing economic rights over fundamental civil liberties).
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the federal court could examine the merits; the disagreement
was over whether it should do so. Peller, as Liebman points
out, 7 fails to recognize that all Justices in both cases agreed
that actual mob intimidation of a jury was a due process violation, and his additional statement that Moore returned due
process law to its pre-Frank state on this point is unsupported
by the authority cited.
Liebman, perhaps misled by Holmes' elaboration for rhetorical reasons in Frank of a point on which there was in fact no
disagreement,' fails to recognize that all Justices considered
the issue of mob domination to be one of fact.259 Moreover-in
the most important holding of Frank, whose poor reputation
among friends of habeas corpus surely owes more to the drama
of the surrounding facts than to the legal doctrine it articulated-all the Justices recognized the power of the district court to
conduct an independent investigation of the facts.2 60 But in
neither Frank nor Moore was the Court engaged in appellate re-

257. See Liebman, supra note 255, at 2079.
258. See supra text accompanying note 108.
259. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915) ("We of course agree that if
a trial is in fact dominated by a mob, so that the jury is intimidated and the trial
judge yields, and so that there is an actual interference with the course of justice,
there is, in that court, a departure from due process of law in the proper sense of
that term. And if the State, supplying no corrective process, carries into execution a
judgment of death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by mob
domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty without due process
of law.").
260. Compare Frank, 237 U.S. at 332 ("The District Court having considered the
case upon the face of the petition, we must do the same, treating it as if demurred
to by the sheriff. There is no doubt of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus. The question is as to the propriety of issuing it in the present case ...
Now the obligation resting upon us, as upon the District Court, [is] to look through
the form and into the very heart and substance of the matter . . .") with id. at 345
(Holmes & Hughes, JJ., dissenting) ("The only question before us is whether the
petition shows on its face that the writ of habeas corpus should be denied, or
whether the District Court should have proceeded to try the facts.").
This decision represents a unanimous rejection of the government's argument,
see supra note 95 and accompanying text, that habeas corpus could be granted only
for jurisdictional defects appearing on the face of the record, and the District Court
lacked power to receive oral evidence. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
The Court has subsequently so read Frank. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54,
59-60 (1968) (unanimous) ("[A]t least tentatively in Frank . . . and more clearly in
Moore . .. , this Court had recognized that a district court was authorized to look
behind the bare record of a trial proceeding and conduct a factual hearing to determine the merits of alleged deprivations of constitutional rights.").
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view of lower court findings of fact; in both, it was reviewing the
summary dismissal of a petition and deciding whether there
should be a hearing-a purely legal question.6 1
And to that purely legal question of when the district court
should exercise its conceded power, the answer was frustrating
but clear: it depends. More formally, the Court unanimously
agreed in Frank that the decision to invoke the power to conduct
a. plenary hearing was a discretionary one. One factor in the
exercise of discretion was to be the procedural rigor of the state's
appellate process. Another was to be the outcome of that process. For the majority, the completeness of the record supplied
by the petitioner was another. Others were left unstated, but
plainly existed.2 62
The Supreme Court split in Frank occurred only when,
proceeding on a de novo basis,2 it applied its discretion to the
facts at hand. The majority believed that, on balance, a hearing

261. Professor Liebman, supra note 255, at 2080 n.503, discerns a difference "between the Court's deferential review of the mob domination issue" and its "de novo
review" of Frank's claim of absence from the verdict. In truth, both were treated the
same way and given the plenary review appropriate to legal issues: In the first
instance, "was the petition properly dismissed?" and in the second "does this state a
constitutional claim?". All Justices agreed that the answer to this second question
was "no," and Justices Holmes and Hughes had wanted to grant Frank's application
for a writ of error so as to review it as a non-constitutional legal question. See supra note 105.
My discussion is not meant to cast any doubt upon-indeed, I believe it supports-Professor Liebman's broader, and excellently documented, thesis locating
Frank at the starting point of a period of "reinvigorated habeas corpus review" for
state prisoners responsive to the diminishing efficacy of the Court's review of their
claims by writ of error. See 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 7, § 2.4e, at 72; supra
note 104.
262. See Comment, Mob-Domination of State Courts and Federal Review by Habeas Corpus, 33 YALE L.J. 82, 84 (1923) (suggesting that embarrassment to foreign
relations might be an example). Cf. Charles H. Watson, Need of Federal Legislation
in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of Lynching of Aliens, 25 YALE. L.J. 561, 578 &
n.22 (1916) (reporting Taft's support of such legislation against states' rights objection). See generally Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't
Make It So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531, 576-77
& nn.151-52 (2000) (describing importance of habeas corpus to protection of national
diplomatic interests).
263. In the special context of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court had long before
Frank established the rule that it would examine the evidence and "proceed to do
that which the court below ought to have done." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 114 (1807). See Freedman, supra note 262, at 566, 572-74.
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should not be held; the dissenters believed the opposite. The
split was not over the rule, but over its application.
This explanation is consistent with the known facts. It is
consistent with the language of Frank and with the arguments
that counsel made in that case. It is consistent with the state's
concession on oral argument in Moore that the district court
could inquire into the facts.2" It is consistent with both opinions in Moore-the majority, which reiterates and applies the
rule that a corrective state appellate process is one factor to be
considered, but holds that other circumstances had greater
weight in the case at hand2 5 5-and the dissent, which states
that the duty of the district judge "was to consider the whole
case and decide whether there appeared to be substantial reason
for further proceedings. " "
All the Justices in Moore not only stated, but acted as
though, they were simply applying the established law. And that
phenomenon makes sense if one takes the established law as being that the decision at hand was discretionary.26 7 Of course,
on that view, the Moore Court would have been applying the

264. See supra text accompanying note 229. As that account indicates, counsel
seems to have sensed that this was a concession he had to make-otherwise, he
would have stuck to the position in his brief that the only question before the Court
was whether the record showed on its face that the trial court was dominated by
the mob, see supra text accompanying note 226.
265. This is the meaning of the otherwise cryptic sentence: "We shall not say
more concerning the corrective process afforded to the petitioners than that it does
not seem to us sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty
of examining the facts for himself," Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923).
266. Moore, 261 U.S. at 101 (McReynolds & Sutherland, JJ., dissenting). Again,
the split was over rule application, and the "doctrine" of the Frank case being appealed to was simply the weight to be placed on the various discretionary factors
presented.
The argument set forth in the text is consistent with that made by Justice
Harlan in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 457-58 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Moore]
cannot be taken to have overruled Frank; it did not purport to do so, and indeed it
was joined by two Justices who had joined in the Frank opinion. Rather, what the
Court appears to have held was that the state appellate court's perfunctory treatment of the question of mob domination . . . was not in fact acceptable corrective
process and federal habeas corpus would therefore lie to consider the merits of the
claim."). See also supra note 9.
267. Admittedly, counsel for the Moore petitioners, although urging the Court to
act on a realistic appraisal of the overall situation, see supra text accompanying note
213, seems to have read Frank in a way more closely akin to the way Bator does,
see supra text accompanying notes 214-20.
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established law even if every Justice on it would have decided
Frank the other way. This might suggest as an objection to my
argument that the rule it proposes is so broad as to be meaningless. But that is not an objection to the accuracy of the
rule-although it certainly does indicate that the standard for
decision is one which (like "the level of care customarily exercised by an ordinarily prudent person") may be less than useful
for predictive purposes.
The next Section considers this and related problems.
VI. INTEGRATING LEGAL AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS

The attempt to "explain" the differing results in Frank and
Moore poses concretely the issue of what we are doing in our
everyday dealing with cases, and why.
The tension between Frank and Moore was evident as soon
as the latter case was decided,2" which is hardly surprising in
view of Justice McReynolds' dissent. A few months later, Felix
Frankfurter asked Justice Brandeis269 how it had come about
that the "Frank case was departed from." The Justice replied,
"Well-Pitney was gone, the late Chief was gone, Day was
gone-the Court had changed."270

268. See Letter from Louis Marshall to Walter White (Mar. 12, 1923), reprinted
in LOUIS MARSHALL: CHAMPION OF LIBERTY, supra note 60, at 316 (commenting,
"The stone that the builders rejected has now become the chief of the corner,"
[Psalms 118:22]); Letter from Walter White to Louis Marshall (Mar. 13, 1923),
NAACP Papers, Library of Congress, Box C-155 (In reply, Assistant Secretary of the
NAACP comments "that the Supreme Court has reversed itself in effect in contrasting this decision with that in the case of Leo Frank."); Letter from Louis Marshall
to Walter White (Mar. 19, 1923), supra note 215 (continuing, after passage quoted in
id., The fact is that the Supreme Court overruled its former decision, and the great
value of the later decision lies in that fact and not in any assumed difference between the two cases."). See also Note, supra note 3, at 248 (describing cases as
presenting "strikingly similar circumstances").
I am grateful to Professor Cortner for assisting me in establishing that
White's letter to Marshall of Mar. 13, 1923, supra, is the same one that is erroneously stated in CORTNER, supra note 131, at 222 n.14 to be located in Box D-44 of
the NAACP Papers.
269. For a sketch of the relationship between Frankfurter and Brandeis, see
HALF BROTHER, HALF SON, supra note 234, at 3-6.
270. Melvin L Urofsky, The Brandeis-FrankfurterConversations, 1985 SuP. CT.
REV. 299, 316 (conversation of July 3, 1923) (footnotes omitted).
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Without recorded pause, he continued with some general
ruminations, not seemingly linked to Moore in particular:
Pitney had a great sense of justice affected by Presbyterianism but no imagination whatever. And then he was much influenced by his experience & he had had mighty little...
The new men-P.B. [Pierce Butler] & Sanford-are still very
new. It takes three or four years to find oneself easily in the
movements of the [Supreme] Court. Sanford's mind gives one
blurs; it does not clearly register. Taft is the worst sinner in
wanting to "settle things" by deciding them when we ought not to,
as a matter of jurisdiction. He says, 'we will have to decide it
sooner or later & better now.' I frequently remind them of Dred
Scott case-Sutherland also had to be held in check. McR.
[McReynolds] cares more about jurisdictional restraints than any
of them-Holmes is beginning to see it.
Of course there are all sorts of considerations that affect one
in dissenting-there is a limit to the frequency with which you
can do it, without exasperating men; then there may not be time,
e.g. Holmes shoots them down so quickly & is disturbed if you
" ' then you may have
hold him up;27
a very important case of
your own as to which you do not want to antagonize on a less
important case etc. etc.
McR. is a very extraordinary personality-what matters most
to him are personal relations, the affections. He is a
Naturmensch-he has very tender affections & correspondingly
hates. He treated Pitney like a dog-used to say the cruelest
things to him ... But no one feels more P's sufferings now-not

as a matter of remorse but merely a sensitiveness to pain. He is a
lonely272person, has few real friends, is very dilatory in his
work.

What is revealing here, of course, is the extent to which
Justice Brandeis locates the influences affecting the work of the
Court almost everywhere but in legal considerations. 3

271. See also id. at 315 ("I wanted to have rule adopted that no case is to go
down until eight days after opinion is circulated . . . Holmes was one of [the] seniors against that-he would be miserable for eight days-he's worry all the time.
He can't wait after he circulates his opinions, to have them back and "to shoot them

off.").
272. Id. at 316-17 (footnotes omitted).
273. This is consistent with the views he expressed throughout the conversations,
ranging over a number of years of the Court's work. Indeed, two days earlier, he
had told Frankfurter, "you must constantly bear in mind the large part played by
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In one sense, Brandeis' explanation-with its emphasis on
the ephemeral contingencies of quotidian reality-may come
closest to capturing as accurately as we can why a particular
Court decision turned out as it did. 4
Yet the adventitious features of decisions and
decisionmakers are just the factors that the rules of legal discourse prohibit from being used as explanatory factors. 5 And
these rules serve important values: They force legal argument to
rest on generally accessible data and facially neutral considerations. Moreover, such a paradigm responds to the powerful
2767
instinct-shared by pigeons... and
people alike,27 7 and doubtless particularly strong in legal actors-to find that the forces
exercising power in one's environment are rational, predictable,
and perhaps controllable.

personal considerations & inadequacy of consideration." Id. at 315 (conversation of
July 1, 1923). See PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUiS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE

364-71 (1984) (describing how Brandeis used this insight to persuade colleagues to
his viewpoint).
274. On a different plane, the Court decision itself will freeze past reality in a
way that may or may not correspond to anything that ever actually happened. The
adjudicated "facts" shape future legal discourse about a case independently of whether any observer other than the decisionmaker would agree that the historical events
were as described. Thus, for example, the effect of the decision described supra at
text accompanying note 56 was to render a good number of real-world happenings,
see supra note 48, non-existent from a legal point of view.
275. See Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J. 1311 (1999) (considering rationale for this prohibition). As Professor Liebman has pointed out to me in
reading this Article in draft, a number of those factors would tend to support the
conclusion that Moore and Frank were significantly different, notably the shared
sense of Frankfurter and Brandeis (not to mention Marshall, see supra note 268)
that the mere factual distinctions between the cases were insufficient to explain the
differing outcomes. One could then read the Moore dissent and Holmes' distress over
Frank as indicating the views of the Justices involved that an important doctrinal
change was taking place.
276. See B.F. Skinner, "Superstition' in the Pigeon, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
168, 171-72 (1948).
277. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 459-61 (1897). For a historical reconsideration of this much-discussed essay, see David J. Seipp, Holmes's Path, 77 B.U. L.REv. 515 (1997). Its jurisprudential contribution was been the subject of several centennial symposia, including one
centered around Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law
One Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353 (1997) and Symposium, The Path of
the Law 100 Years Later: Holmes's Influence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 1 (1997); see also Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691
(1997) (commenting on the latter symposium).
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Perhaps the way to give both the aleatory and rational factors their due is to view the matter from the perspective of the
future. As time passes, the force of contingent contemporary
pressures fades, and legal rules must prove their merits on other
grounds. At the time it is rendered, the immediate personal and
political context of any Supreme Court opinion will naturally
have primacy in the understandings of contemporary actors. But
the individuals involved-the litigants, the lawyers, and even
the scholars-will die. And as the passions and memories of the
contemporary context fade, they will have less and less influence
on the opinion's survival, which will depend increasingly on its
intellectual and practical power as a tool of persuasion in the
context of new controversies. In short, what is left will be legal
argument-although, to be sure, it will hopefully be legal argument enriched by a knowledge of history.27 s
Thus, to say that one legal theory or another provides a
more persuasive explanation for the differing outcomes of Frank
and Moore is to say a good deal, even if one is thinking historically.2 79 For it is that explanation-and not the one closer to
capturing the texture of the contemporary events of the past in
the Brandeis sense-that is likely to have the most impact on
the future.
278. I sidestep at this point as being tangential to the argument at hand the
persisting complaints from historians that history as practiced by lawyers and legal
scholars alike is simply a search for scraps of data to support pre-conceived positions, rather than an honest effort to recreate the past. See, e.g., Michael Bellesiles,
Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16 CONST. COMM. 247, 247250 (1999); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 524-25 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal
Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934 (1996). Cf.
Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 124 (1997) (arguing that "we should recognize that
both . . . lawyers' legal history and historians' legal history, are valuable."). See
generally Paul Horwitz, The Past Tense: The History of Crisis--and the Crisis of
History-in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALB. L. REV. 459 (1997); Neil M. Richards, Clio
and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 13 J.L. &
POL. 809 (1997).
279. This is particularly the case because one aspect of a legally persuasive argument is accounting for known historical events-including, but not limited to, the
outcomes of cases-more persuasively than competing attempts at reconciling the
same data.
Intriguingly, recent work in history in fields remote from law is beginning to
grapple with the same questions. See PAUL A. COHEN, HISTORY IN THREE KEYS: THE
BOXERS AS EVENT, EXPERIENCE, AND MYTH 294-95 (1997).
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As Holmes recognized,' however, this insight may be of
limited use to legal actors who consider the brevity of their own
lifespans, particularly to those legal actors who must put bread
on the table through legal practice while awaiting the vindication of history. 1 Fortunately, even over the shorter term, law
is at least an element in outcome of decisions and therefore entitled to some predictive weight. And even the broadest of legal
rules gain predictive power as they are applied in decided cases
to specific fact patterns and as their underlying principles are
explored through legal and public dialogue.
To be sure, no legal actor-not even the judge making the
ruling-can know with precision just how decisive an element
legal principles are in the decision of cases. 2 In the field of

280. See Thomas C. Grey, Plotting the Path of Law, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 19, 56
(1997).
281. Cf. James L. Robertson, From the Bench: Reality on Appeal, 17 LITIG. 3
(1990) (State Supreme Court Justice urges appellate advocates who want to win to
create book containing extensive background information on each judge who will
hear case). For similar advice from federal Circuit Court judges, see Myron H.
Bright, How to Succeed on Appeal: A View From the Bench, 27 TRIAL 67, 67 (1991);
Albert J. Engel, Oral Advocacy at the Appellate Level, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 463, 467
(1981).
282. The attempt to quantify, in testable terms, the degree to which Supreme
Court votes are determined by precedent as opposed to Justice' policy preferences
has recently occupied a good deal of attention among political scientists, see e.g.,
HAROLD I. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999), reviewed by Donald R.
Songer, Book Review, 93 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 983 (1999). An extensive forum on the
subject appeared at 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 971-1082 (1996), and some of the key debaters subsequently presented their views at book length in LEE EPSTEIN & JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998), reviewed by Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511 (1998).
For a general overview of the political science research, emphasizing how far
it has yet to go to achieve a satisfactory level of explanation for judicial behavior,
see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); see also Edward L.
Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 490, 496 (1996)
(noting weakness of public choice theory to explain judicial action); see generally
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 215558 (1998) (reviewing and critiquing scholarship on extent to which Supreme Court
doctrine controls lower court decisionmaking); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998). There is a comprehensive list of references at James F. Sprigg, et al., Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme
Court: Justices' Responses to Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485, 503-06 (1999).

1540

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 51:4:1467

habeas corpus, it may well be that most accurate way to predict
outcomes over the last fifteen years would have been uniformly
to place the bet that the petitioner would lose,' just as it may
be that the most statistically accurate way to predict the outcome of cases in general would be to bet on a victory for the
party with the most money.
But, even if entirely true as statistical generalizations, these
insights would be of limited use, not just because they would
have so little predictive power as applied to individual cases, not
just because they would tend to rob the work of legal actors of
meaning (and economic reward),' but because to act on the
insights would be to deny the larger truth that-over both the
shorter and the longer term-law, as a human creation, changes.
And it changes because of the efforts of individuals. 5
And that is why, to conclude with Holmes, the law offers all
of its acolytes "the secret isolated joy of the thinker, who knows
that, a hundred years after he is dead and forgotten, men who
never heard of him will be moving to the measure of his
thought-the subtile [sic] rapture of a postponed power.""5

For an initial attempt at locating this body of work within legal norms, see
Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97
MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999).
283. Cf. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 386 (1984) (per curiam) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Since the beginning of the October 1981 Term, the Court has decided
in summary fashion 19 cases, including this one, concerning the constitutional rights
of persons accused or convicted of crimes. All 19 were decided on the petition of the
warden or prosecutor, and in all he was successful in obtaining reversal of a decision upholding a claim of constitutional right.").
284. In this sense, everyone professionally involved in the system shares an interest in the viewpoint that it works in accordance with accessible legal rules.
285. Cf. Eric M. Freedman, Book Review, 48 BROOK- L. REV. 391, 394 (1982)
(criticizing as "defeatist" liberal critics of the Burger Court who were content to do
no more than "to hope that in due course a new majority will render more desirable
opinions").
286. O.W. HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 29,
32 (1921).

